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In the World, But Not of it: Japanese
Companies Exploiting the U.S. Civil Rights
Law
KIYOKo KAMIO KNAPP*
... Japan is a nation which has pursued commerce to the ends of the




A kimono-clad Oriental woman carries a torch of liberty on the front
cover of the October 9, 1989, issue of Newsweek magazine. The illustra-
tion accompanies the headline Japan Invades Hollywood.' The magazine
article depicts Japan's purchase of a "piece of America's soul,"' referring
to Sony's 3.4 billion-dollar takeover of Columbia Pictures Entertain-
ment.' To the majority of Americans surveyed in that article, Japan's eco-
nomic power posed a greater threat than the military power of the then
Soviet Union.'
Japan has built itself as one of the world's economic leaders. Between
1979 and 1990, annual Japanese investment in the U.S. skyrocketed
nearly eighty-fold, from 257 million to 19.9 billion dollars. 6 Major Japa-
* I was born in Japan and lived there for 24 years before moving to the United States.
In this article, I base some of the general descriptions of the Japanese personnel manage-
ment on my own experiences and observations while living in Japan.
Unless otherwise indicated, I am responsible for the accuracy of all Japanese transla-
tions. Japanese authors are cited as they appear on the publication. Some authors follow the
traditional Japanese style of placing the author's surname first, followed by their first name;
others follow the Western style. For authors in the former category, only surnames are used
for subsequent references.
1. JARAD TAYLOR, THE SHADOWS OF THE RISING SUN: A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE "JAPANESE
MIRACLE" 257 (1983).
2. In the translated version of the Newsweek magazine sold in Japan, the same head-
line read: Sony Shingeki [Sony Advances (against Hollywood)] (emphasis added). Hiroshi
Ando, 57 NICHIBEI JYOHO MASATSU [JAPAN-U.S. INFORMATION FRICTION] (1991).
3. Japan Goes Hollywood, NEWSWEEK, October 9, 1989, at 62.
4. Id. See also Japan Corporate Takeovers Abroad Hit 404 in 1989, L.A. TIMES, Janu-
ary 11, 1990, at 3 (reporting that the number of mergers and acquisitions involving Japanese
corporations at home and abroad in 1989 totaled 659, valued at $212 billion).
5. Japan Goes Hollywood, supra note 3.
6. Eileen M. Mullen, Rotating Japanese Managers in American Subsidiaries of Japa-
nese Firms: A Challenge for American Employment Discrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV.
687, 729 n.13 (1993), citing Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors in 1985, 66
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nese firms have achieved a significant portion of their investment in the
United States by establishing branches and subsidiaries.' Accordingly, in
1989, the number of Americans working for Japanese companies
amounted to 500,000.' This has triggered a rise in discrimination charges
Americans have asserted against their Japanese employers.' Plaintiffs
SURV. CURRENT Bus. at 50, tbl. 5 (May 1986) and Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or Established by Foreign Di-
rect Investors in 1991, 72 SURV. CURRENT Bus. at 72, tbl. 4 (May 1992). Political economist
Pat Choate reported that, as of 1990, the Japanese own $285 billion of America's direct and
portfolio assets, control more than $329 billion of U.S. banking assets (a 14% share of the
U.S. market), possess more real estate holdings in the U.S. than the members of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) combined, and trade up to 25% of the daily volume on the New
York Stock Exchange. PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE at Introduction (1990). Further-
more, the Greenlining Coalition, a California organization composed of minority groups and
consumers, provided the following information on Japanese direct investment in August,
1991: "Matsushita Electronic alone has an annual revenue of $44 billion, more than 12 times
that of Walt Disney Studios;" "Japanese companies control a quarter of all American mo-
tion picture production;" "[o]ver the last two years, the top 10 major Japanese investors
have bought more than $23 billion in American companies . Lantos Hearings, infra
note 30, at 329.
7. Robert Abraham, Limitations on the Right of Japanese Employers to Select Em-
ployees of Their Choice under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 6 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475 (1991). For a historical background of Japanese foreign invest-
ment, see Tomoko Hamada, Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and Its Over-
seas Managers, in JAPANESE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 135, 136-139 (Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed.,
1992). For a discussion of Japan's foreign trade, see generally EDWIN 0. REISCHAER, THE
JAPANESE TODAY 370-80 (1988); see also JON WORONOFF, JAPAN As ANYTHING-BUT-NUMBER
ONE 206 (1991) (noting that "[u]nlike Europe and America, where trade followed the flag,
Japan's flag followed trade"). Ronald Morse, Executive Vice President of Economic Strategy
Institute, explains that about 40% of total Japanese direct investments are located in the
U.S., of which 35% are in real estate. Lantos Hearings, infra note 30, at 177-78. Many of the
companies actively involved in foreign direct investment are classified as high-technology
firms, automobile makers, chemical firms, and machinery manufacturers. Hamada, supra, at
138. Japanese firms also often enter foreign markets through mergers and acquisitions. Id.
See also Gita Khadiri, The Effect of the United States-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation on Japanese Investment in United States Real Estate, 4 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 591, 596-98 (discussing recent Japanese investment in United States real
estate); Jeffrey M. Lavine, Foreign Investment in Japan: Understanding the Japanese Sys-
tem and its Legal and Cultural Barriers to Entry, 9 B. U. INT'L L.J. 149 (1991) (exploring
the evolution of the Japanese legal system and its interplay in creating foreign investment
barriers).
8. Delineated by geography, the figure represents 100,000 in California, 42,000 in New
York, 38,000 in Illinois, 35,000 in Ohio, and 30,000 in Hawaii. PITFALLS FOR JAPANESE EM-
PLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES at i (William J. Kilberg et. al., eds., 1993) [hereinafter
PrrFALLS].
9. For a detailed analysis of two landmark cases involving employment discrimination
by Japanese multinational firms, see infra sections IV. A. (2) & (3) (discussing Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) and Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d
389 (7th Cir. 1991)). Other cases against Japanese employers include Nghiem v. NEC Elec-
tronics, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a U.S. citizen of Vietnamese heritage
claiming wrongful termination and race discrimination); Papaila v. Uniden America Corp.,
840 F.Supp. 440 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (involving a breach of employment contract as well as
discrimination based on race, national origin, and age); Fitzgibbon v. Sanyo Securities
America, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 2818 (RPP), 1994 WL 281928 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1994) (involving
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have mainly claimed violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,10 which bans discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."
claims of, among others, national origin and age discrimination, infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and breach of contract); Bagnell v. Komatsu Dresser Co., 838 F.Supp. 1279 (1993)
(N.D. Ill.) (involving a discharged employee asserting national origin discrimination); Blaise-
Williams v. Sumitomo Bank Ltd., 189 A.D.2d 584, 592 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1993) (involving a bank
employee claiming that she was passed over for promotion based on her race, sex, color, or
national origin); Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc., 828 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involv-
ing claim of unlawful discharge based on their national origin); EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A, Inc.,
939 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving a Japanese company's use of an internal coding
system to screen out job applicants by race, gender, and age); Yap v. Sumitomo Corp. of
America, No. 88 Civ. 700 (LBS), 1991 WL 29112 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 22, 1991) (involving claim
that defendant "discriminated in favor of Japanese nationals in staffing management posi-
tions"); Walsh v. Eagle Wings Industries, Inc., No.89-2052, 1991 WL 90906 (C.D. Ill., Jan.
17, 1991) (involving claim arising over the company's refusal to give the American plaintiff
the same relocation benefits as those given to Japanese employees and disallowing him to
enter language classes comparable to those offered to Japanese employees); Adames v. Mit-
subishi Bank, Ltd. 751 F.Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (challenging discrimination on the
basis of race, descent, ancestry, and ethnic characteristics including a "dual staff system"
which adversely affected non-Oriental employees); Van Abrahams v. Pioneer Electronics
U.S.A Inc., No. CV 88-7868-RSWL, 1989 WL 225579 (C.D.Cal. June 21, 1989) (involving
national origin discrimination); Kelly v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(involving wrongful discharge, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
etc.); EEOC v. Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd., No.79 CIV. 1625 (MGC), 1986 WL 14290 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 11, 1986) (involving age discrimination against management employees between the
ages of 40 and 65 who were terminated); Toshiba America Inc., v. Simmons, 104 A.D.2d 649,
480 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1984) (involving an employee counterclaiming for damages for wrongful
discharge against the employer filing an action for money had and received); Spiess v. C.
Itoh & Co. (America), Inc. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S.
1128 (1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984) (involving an employees alleging discrimina-
tion in managerial promotions and other benefits); Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc. 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1679 (BNA) (N.D.Ill. 1981) (involving a challenge to the firm's establish-
ment of a an employment system which limited the opportunities of non-Japanese employ-
ees as well as his discharge based on national origin); Fujita v. Sumitomo Bank of Califor-
nia, 70 F.R.D. 406 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (involving female bank employees alleging gender
discrimination). See also McDuffie v. Nissei Sangyo America, Ltd., 989 F.2d 493 (4th Cir.
1993); Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 834 (1992); Blom v. N.G.K.
Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 (1992); Ross v. Nikko Sec.
Co. Int'l, 133 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Shiseido Cosmetics (America) Ltd. v. State Human
Rights Appeal Board, 72 A.D.2d 711, 421 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1979).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). The Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants in any way which
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
11. Other federal antidiscrimination laws include the following: §1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1988); §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
1995
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This body of litigation has sparked a debate among observers. Some
critics view racism and sexism as byproducts of Japan's direct foreign in-
vestment.19 On the other hand, some assert that anti-Japanese senti-
ment,"8 fueled by bilateral trade friction, has painted an overly harsh pic-
ture of Japan's economic expansion.
1'
Notwithstanding the debate, Japanese multinational firms must
strive to minimize the risk of discrimination suits by adopting defensive
strategies."5 At the heart of the U.S. civil rights laws is the principle of
fairness to individuals." Operating in the nation of immigrants, Japanese
multinational firms must understand and appreciate America's commit-
ment to individual dignity.17 Most importantly, employers should adopt a
personnel policy which evaluates employees by their intrinsic merit.
Not only international criticism but also social changes in Japan have
§1983 (1988); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1988); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12213 (1988); Equal Pay
Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-
1(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C.A.
§1324B (West Supp. 1991). These laws are supplemented by state and local fair employment
laws. This article focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
12. See generally William H. Lash III, Unwelcome Imports: Racism, Sexism, and For-
eign Investment, MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991). The same author also testified about discrimi-
natory practices by Japanese multinational firms at a Congressional hearing, which will be
discussed in later sections. See Lantos Hearings, infra note 30, at 394-406. Studies reveal
mounting criticism against similar problems with Japanese firms in Great Britain, France,
and Germany as well. Tomasz Mroczkowski & Richard G. Linowes, Inside the Japanese
Corporation Abroad: Views of American Professionals, 23 MGMT. JAPAN 28 (1990).
13. See infra section III. B.
14. Individuals of this viewpoint argue that some American firms engage in similar dis-
criminatory practices. Interview with Terry Morrison, Human Resources Consultant for
Japanese corporations in Portland, Oregon (March 25, 1994). For a complete discussion of
employment discrimination charges from the Japanese perspective, see infra section III. A.
15. Tsuyoshi Ohishi & Naoto Sasaki, How to Operate a Business in International
Communities, 26 MGMT. JAPAN 3, 5 (1993) (observing that few Japanese companies have
forged policies on international management).
16. See e.g. Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HA~v. L.
REV. 1, 5-12 (1976) (discussing rationales for opposing discrimination); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (Title VII purports to "achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees"). As sociologist Robert Bellah wrote,
"[i]ndividualism lies at the very core of American culture." Abraham, supra note 7, at 480
(citing ROBERT BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 142 (1985)).
17. EEOC chairman Evan Kemp discussed how workforce equality should be enforced
by foreign and domestic employers: "the single best way ... is to make the people who
make the personnel decisions aware that they must hire in compliance with our Federal,
State, and local statutes that prohibit job discrimination." Lantos Hearings, infra note 30,
at 71. Tatsuo Inoue emphasizes Japan's need to "seek a more balanced approach in accom-
modating the tension between communitarianism and individualism." Tatsuo Inoue, The
Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking through the Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 517, 520 (1993).
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bolstered the argument for such a merit system.18 The prolonged reces-
sion19 is now forcing many firms to depart from established norms such as
lifetime employment and seniority-based wages.20 The traditional values
of Japanese corporate culture collide with the trends demanding a lasting
change in the domestic labor market.2 1 Revitalization of the Japanese
economy requires effective allocation of human resources to maximize in-
dividual strengths.2 Thus, creating a work environment based on respect
of diversity represents a task that Japan must fulfill both at home and
abroad.2 3 Playing a vital role in the world economy, Japan must confront
18. Numerous writings have recently covered the subject on challenges facing Japanese
corporate management. See generally ROCHELLE Kopp, THE RICE-PAPER CEILING: BREAKING
THROUGH JAPANESE CORPORATE CULTURE 221-32 (1994); KOICHI HORI, NIJYU-ISSEIKI No KI-
GYO SYSTEM [THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY] (1993); IWAo NAKATANI,
NIHON KIGYO FUKATrSU No JYOKEN [WHAT IT TAKES TO REBUILD JAPANESE CORPORATIONS]
(1993); KAWARU NIHON GATA KoYo [JAPAN'S CHANGING EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM] (Akira
Takanashi ed., 1994) [hereinafter Kawaru Nihon], RYo HATO, POSUTO SHUSHIN KoYo [POST-
LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT] (1994); Takamitsu Sawa & Yoko Ishikura, Okina Henka-ga
Hajimaru: Ikinokoreru Hito-wa Dareda [Big Change Taking Place: Who will Survive?],
NIKKEI WOMAN, Oct. 1994, at 68-69; Shintaro Hori, Fixing Japan's White-Collar Economy:
A Personal View, Nov.-Dec., HARV. BUS. REV. 157 (1991). Jiro Ushio, Chairman of Ushio
Inc., a maker of industrial lamps and optical electronics, emphasizes that the three areas
which need to be improved are "the excessively employee-oriented Japanese-style manage-
ment system that guarantees lifetime employment and ties promotions and wages to the
seniority system; industrial rules that overemphasize cooperation between government and
business; and the system of cross-shareholdings between companies." Osamu Katayama,
Back to the Drawing Board, 39 LOOK JAPAN 4, 11-12 (1993). Koichi Hori, President of the
Boston Consulting Group, asserts that true globalization should begin within Japan. If only
foreign branches and subsidiaries of Japanese firms force themselves to become "globalized"
simply by hiring more locals, some cultural barriers will still remain between Japanese expa-
triates and local staff. This, Hori says, is a natural consequence of the vastly different values
underlying Japanese and American-style management: the former based on seniority and
the latter on individual qualifications. Thus, Japanese employers should adopt a merit sys-
tem in order to create globally acceptable corporate culture. See HoRi, supra, at 237-78. One
scholar opines that Japanese society on the whole needs a "moral reorientation which places
a greater emphasis on individual rights." Inoue, supra note 17, at 545.
19. For a discussion of the rise of the Japanese yen and its adverse effect on Japan's
export-oriented economy, see infra section V. A. See also Paul Blustein, Learning to Expect
Trouble Instead of a Bubble; Long-Term Problems Slow Economic Recovery, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 1994, at H1.
20. See generally Yamamoto Harumi, The Lifetime Employment System, 40 JAPAN Q.
(1993); Thomasz Mcrozkowski & Masao Hanaoka, Continuity and Change in Japanese
Management, in JAPANESE Bus. 271-87 (Subhash Durlabhji & Norton E. Marks, eds., 1993).
See also NAKATANI, supra note 18, at 12-23 (discussing the current recession in Japan and
the challenges it presents to the Japanese employment system).
21. For a general description of Japanese business management, see JAPAN: A COUNTRY
STUDY 115, 116-17, 216-18 (Ronald E. Dolan & Robert L. Worden, eds., 5th ed. 1992). For a
comparative analysis of business management in Japan and the U.S., see, e.g., Mullen,
supra note 6, at 744-58; Abraham, supra note 7, at 479-84; Marcia J. Cavens, Japanese
Labor Relations and Legal Implications of Their Possible Use in the United States, 5
N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 585 (1983).
22. See Kopp, supra note 18, at 51 (emphasizing globalization of human resources as
"the only way for Japanese companies to insure their international competitiveness").
23. According to Ronald A. Morse, Japanese society will benefit from the pursuit of the
1995
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the challenge of building global companies that are not only "in the
world," but also "of it."
'24
This article analyzes employment discrimination by Japanese firms
in the U.S. and recommends integration of diverse individuals into the
core labor force as an essential element of global management. Numerous
scholarly articles have explored issues related to the availability of affirm-
ative defenses2" for Japanese employers facing discrimination charges.2
issues relating to discrimination by Japanese corporations in the U.S. Lantos Hearings, in-
fra note 30, at 173.
24. Mroczkowski & Linowes, supra note 12, at 30 (1990). Jared Taylor also uses the
expression "in the world, but not of it" to refer to Japanese people. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at
91. Edwin Reischauer assigns building meaningful relationships with other peoples as the
greatest single obstacle the Japanese face today. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 408. He fur-
ther explains that Japan must become a fully cooperative member of the international com-
munity by abandoning its sense of uniqueness. Id. at 410. See alsd HORI, supra note 18, at
24 (describing that the world is sending a message to Japan, urging to contribute to global
society); Emma Louise Young, in JAPAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 55 (Frederica M. Bunge, ed.,
1983) (explaining that the nation's economic success has motivated Japanese people to en-
gage in "considerable soul searching" about its role in the world); Paul Lansing & Tamra
Domeyer, Japan's Attempt at Internationalization and its Lack of Sensitivity to Minority
Status, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 135, 137 (1991) (stating that Japan needs to cooperate with
the rest of the world, proving its sincere effort to conform); Lantos Hearings, infra note 30,
at 174 (containing the following statement by Ronald Morse: "Now that Japan is not iso-
lated from the world, and if they are going to prove themselves as good citizens globally, the
responsibility will be on the Japanese side, in Japan, to be able to really come up to the
standard of international employment practices and other types of behavior").
25. An affirmative defense can be defined as "[a] response to a plaintiff's claim which
attacks the plaintiff's legal right to bring an action, as opposed to attacking the truth of
claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the affirmative de-
fenses applicable to Japanese corporations in employment discrimination cases, see infra
section IV.
26. See e.g. Mark B. Schaffer, The Implications of Japanese Culture on Employment
Discrimination Laws in the United States, 16 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 343 (1993); Jeffrey J.
Mayer, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Attempts to Reconcile the United States-Japan
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Title VII, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
328 (1992); Michael S. Kimm, Domestic Employees and Title VII Versus Foreign Employ-
ers and "FCN" Treaties: A 21st Century Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 95 (1991); Made-
lene C. Amendola, American Citizens as Second Class Employees: The Permissible Dis-
crimination, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 625 (1990); Dana Marie Crom, Clash of the Cultures: U.S.
Japan-Treaty of Friendship, Title VII, and Women in Management, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. 337
(1990); Gary Singh, Japanese Employment Practices under American Law, 2 INT'L LEGAL
PESSP. (1990); Matthew Orebic, Japanese Companies on United States Soil: Treaty Privi-
leges vs. Title VII Restraints, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 377 (1986); Barbara A.
Ritomsky & Robert M. Jarvis, Doing Business in America: The Unfinished Work of
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. (1986); Nobuhisa Ishizuka,
Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights under Commercial Treaties to
Hire Employees "Of Their Choice", 86 COLUM. L. REV. 139 (1986); Paul Lansing & Laura
Palmer, Sumitomo Shoji v. Avagliano: Sayonara to Japanese Employment Practices in
Conflict with Title VII, 28 ST. Lois U. L.J. 153 (1984); Francine McNulty, Employment
Rights of Japanese-America Joint Ventures in the United States under the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1225 (1984);
Note, Yankees Out of North America: Foreign Employer Job Discrimination Against
American Citizens, 83 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1984); Stacey M. Rostner, Beyond The FCN
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This article, however, focuses on limitations to those defenses and dis-
cusses what steps should be taken in order to keep problems from
erupting.
II. PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BY JAPANESE FIRMS IN
THE UNITED STATES
In today's global age, various forms of employment discrimination,
7
as well as cars and televisions, have transcended Japan's national bor-
der.2 Through its economic activities in the U.S., Japanese multinational
firms have introduced their employment practices to the American pub-
lic. Some of these practices clash with U.S. civil rights laws and social
norms.2" Deep concerns over the Japanese corporate behavior finally
forced Congress to confront the issue; in 1991, the Employment and
Housing Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions held three hearings entitled Employment Discrimination by Japa-
nese-Owned Companies in the United States led by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-
California). 0 The Subcommittee heard testimonies from aggrieved em-
Treaty: Japanese Multinationals under Title VII, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 871 (1983); John
Bruce Lewis & Bruce L. Ottley, Title VII and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Treaties: Prognostications Based upon Sumitomo Shoji, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 45 (1983).
27. Japan has made little concerted effort to promote workforce equality. Various forms
of job discrimination have prevailed, because "Japanese corporate society has traditionally
been a society based on rank, class, and discrimination." Uchihashi Katsuto, Downsizing,
Japanese Style, 21 JAPAN ECHO 47, 48 (comparing lack of attempt to combat discrimination
in Japan with the U.S. approach to fair employment practices).
28. See Kenneth B. Noble, A Clash of Styles: Japanese Companies in U.S. Under Fire
for Cultural Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1988 at A16 (discussing discrimination charges
against Japanese firms in California, the nation's primary legal battleground, largely due to
the concentration of American executives working for Asian-controlled electronics busi-
nesses in the San Francisco Bay area). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has expressed its growing concern for bias suits involving multinational firms in
general. Lairold M. Street, who has worked with the International Trade Commission and is
currently employed by the EEOC, suggests that this concern stems from expansion of eco-
nomic activities by foreign-owned firms: statistics in 1989 indicated that 130 foreign firms
chose the greater Washington D.C. area to conduct business in the U.S. This, Street says, is
a five-fold increase from a decade ago. Lairold M. Street, Helping Japanese Firms Cope
with Employee Benefits and U.S. Labor and Employment Laws, 35 HOWARD L.J. 381, 382
(1992). See also Kopp, supra note 18.
29. Most notably, the primacy of group harmony emphasized by Japanese firms con-
flicts with individualistic values held by Americans. Ohishi & Sasaki, supra note 15, at 4.
See also James R. Lincoln, Employee Work Attitudes and Management Practice in the
U.S. and Japan: Evidence from a Large Comparative Survey, Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 89 (Fall
1988) (discussing how work attitudes are different in Japan and in the U.S. based on a
survey on 106 factories and their 8,302 employees in the U.S. (central Indiana) and Japan
(Kanagawa Prefecture)); Abraham, supra note 7, at 479-484 (examining the differences be-
tween Japanese and American business practices).
30. These hearings were held on July 23, August 8, and September 24 of 1991. Alleged
discriminatory practices ranged from disparaging comments to exclusion of Americans from
the decision-making process. Employment Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Companies
in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
1995
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ployees, Japanese employers, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission s ' officials, and labor specialists. One witness characterized dis-
crimination by her former Japanese employer as institutional as opposed
to individualized discrimination."2 Chairman Lantos emphatically stated
that U.S. citizens, who work for Japanese firms, are crying out in anguish
as second-class citizens in their own nation. 8 The Lantos Hearings shed
light on "what has been a significant undercurrent in much of the debate
over Japanese investment:" "how American employees are faring at Japa-
nese firms." s4
Some of the witnesses at the Lantos Hearings have also initiated law-
suits under Title VII. The U.S. took up the challenge of eradicating job
discrimination when Congress enacted the Civil Rihgts Act in 1964. Title
VII prohibits discrimination by employers, labor organizations, and em-
ployment agencies on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 5 It embodies the universally held principles of fairness and equal-
ity in American society. The Fifth Circuit has, for instance, construed
Title VII as reflecting an "assumption that Congress sought a formula
that would not only achieve the optimum use of our labor resources but
(1991) [hereinafter Lantos Hearings]. In his opening statement at the first hearing, Rep.
Lantos stated as follows: "The Japanese have modernized some old plants, built new facto-
ries, and created many new jobs for American workers. As a Nation, we welcome Japanese
investment, but we cannot and will not allow Japanese companies in the process to flout our
values and principles or violate our labor, civil rights, and nondiscrimination laws." Id. at 1.
Journalist Kishi Nagami documented critical part of these hearings in his book for a Japa-
nese audience. He asserted that the hearings had captured little media attention in Japan.
Thus, Nagami concludes, few Japanese recognize that the discrimination issues even exist.
NAGAMI KISHI, UTTAERARERU ZAIBEI NIHON KIGYO [EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES BY
JAPANESE-OWNED COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES] 1-3 (1992).
31. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter EEOC] consists of
five Presidentially-appointed members. This agency is in charge of processing employment
discrimination charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act [hereinafter Title VII]. See
42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (1988).
32. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 46 (Susan Minshukin, former employee of Nikko
Securities, basing this distinction on her own work experience at Merrill Lynch and Nikko.
The former had a number of male sales assistants, whereas the latter filled such "helper"
jobs with women). Judy Teller shares her observation as follows: " ... in American corpora-
tions, it's at least conceded that [gender discrimination] is a no-no. Men may believe that
women should be kept barefoot, pregnant and on the edge of town, but it's not acceptable,
legally or in social terms, to behave that way. Within the context of Japanese corporation, it
seems to me . . . there is a tradition of subordinate positions for women." Id. at 45.
33. Lantos further stated: "I think we are opening up an ugly chapter in United States-
Japan relations." He added that this chapter will not be closed until Japanese firms end its
discriminatory practices against Americans. Id. at 42. See also REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at
395-400 (describing racist attitudes among the Japanese as a reflection of a "we-they" di-
chotomy). Nagami Kishi presumes that some sanctions may be given in the future to Japa-
nese corporations which violate the U.S. civil rights laws. They may include restrictions of
the visas granted to Japanese managerial employees rotated from parent companies (cur-
rently 80,000 visas per year) and exclusion of the Japanese from the jobs with the U.S.
government. KISHI, SUPRA note 30, at 235.
34. Kopp, supra note 18, at 20.
35. For the relevant provisions, see supra note 10.
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. . .would enable individuals to develop as individuals." s Title VII has
given litigants a useful tool in regulating employers' outward behavior in-
fluenced by arbitrary generalizations of particular groups.
By violating the letter and the spirit of Title VII, "the cornerstone,
as well as touchstone of employment discrimination law, ' s Japanese em-
ployers have failed to honor America's commitment to workforce equality.
This section analyzes the general patterns of employment discrimination
by Japanese firms in the United States based on the testimonies at the
Lantos Hearings as well as case law.
A. Discrimination in Recruitment and Hiring
Recruitment and hiring have posed a major challenge to Japanese
multinational firms." A recent Japan Society poll reveals that nearly one
third of the surveyed U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms have received com-
plaints of discrimination in their hiring and promotion practices. 0
In general, Japanese employers abroad hire a disproportionately low
percentage of Americans for upper-level management. 1 They systemati-
36. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386-387 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (emphasis added).
37. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(emphasizing Congressional intent to combat overt discrimination, "the most obvious evil").
38. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (Mack A. Player et al.,
eds., 1990).
39. WILLIAM C. BYHAM, SHOGUN MANAGEMENT 151 (1993). "Just consider the sheer
number of differences in education, skill levels, culture, and expectations between the Japa-
nese and North Americans." Id.
40. Kopp, supra note 18, at 22 (citing DANIEL BOB AND SRI INTERNATIONAL, JAPANESE
COMPANIES IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 41 (1990)).
41. In their 1990 article, Mroczkowski and Linowes, both Professors of Business Ad-
ministration at American University, wrote that more than one million non-Japanese em-
ployees work for Japanese companies worldwide. Nonetheless, a study by Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry revealed that these companies typically fill staff man-
agement positions with Japanese expatriates: "Of the top officials at Japanese owned sub-
sidiaries abroad, 45.4% had been transferred from the home office against 17.3% for foreign-
owned subsidiaries in Japan." Mroczkowski & Linowes, supra note 12, at 28. Associate Pro-
fessor Schon Beechler of Columbia Business School explains: "Japanese companies are still
using more than double the percentage of expatriates in their foreign affiliates than is typi-
cal of Western multinationals." Anne G. Perkins, Japanese Multinationals: The Hiring of
Expatriates Persists, HARV. Bus. REV. 72 (Sept./Oct. 1994). Lewis Steel, a civil rights attor-
ney who has handled a series of discrimination cases against Japanese employers, observes
that some Japanese parent companies send over employees even for the lowest level of man-
agement. Among these firms, Japanese nationals occupy 30-40% of the entire workforce.
Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 159. Judy Teller concluded, through her own experiences
and observations at DCA Advertising (a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese advertise-
ment company), that national origin and gender, rather than merit and dedication, consti-
tute determining factors in an employee's future. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 25
(explaining that American law, belief, and custom have been trampled). See also HORI,
supra note 18, at 228-29 (1993) (discussing the low percentage of local employees assigned
to managerial or executive positions at Japanese multinational firms); NAKATANI, supra note
18, at 42 (stating that virtually no Japanese firms in the U.S. would even consider the possi-
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cally reserve managerial or executive positions for Japanese nationals ro-
tated from parent companies.' 2 Due to the sheer number of Japanese ex-
patriates, 43  their values dominate corporate culture." These values
bility of promoting American managers to presidents or chief executive officers); Lansing &
Palmer, supra note 26, at 165-66 (explaining that Japanese firms intend to facilitate a better
understanding of the overall business operation through rotation of executives from one
subsidiary to another). Few Japanese companies, both at home and abroad, hire foreigners
as regular employees. John Shook, the first foreign employee of Toyota Motor Corporation
in Japan made the following statement: "The whole company infrastructure is set up for the
Japanese . . . we don't fit. If the company gets serious about hiring more foreigners, things
will have to change." ROBERT M. MARCH, WORKING FOR A JAPANESE COMPANY: MANAGING
RELATIONSHIPS IN A MULTICULTURAL ORGANIZATION 16 (1992). Typically, local staff play an
extremely limited role in the business operation, isolated from the firm's decision-making
process. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 156-71 (containing a written statement by Lewis
Steel, a civil rights attorney who has dealt with Japanese firms). Japanese employers often
hire foreigners simply for their linguistic skills. A 1988 survey shows that three out of four
foreign employees of Japanese firms are hired for international activities, and one in five for
language skills. MARCH, SUPRA note 41, at 113. "Foreigners working for Japanese companies
in Japan often feel frustrated by their limited duties, such as checking English texts for
grammar or entertaining foreign visitors." This manifests the common perception among
Japanese employers that foreigners will stay with the company only temporarily. At the
same time, the employees' lack of Japanese-speaking skills may be another contributing
factor. Id. at 114. They often hire locals merely as temporary contract workers. Id. at 115.
Robert March refers to these foreign employees as second-class, "disposable" citizens. He
also introduces the case of Denis Pawley, who was the top-ranking manager at Mazda USA
in Flat Rock, Michigan. Pawley resigned in three years, convinced that he' would never be
given meaningful authority. March points out that Pawley erroneously expected to become a
top executive in Mazda, because Japanese auto companies consider it essential for their
global strategies to keep Japanese nationals in control. Id. at 164-65.
42. These companies value frequent rotation of managers, including overseas assign-
ments, as a way to develop and maintain organizational flexibility. One American manager
criticizes temporal overseas assignments of Japanese managers. He calls this common prac-
tice a "revolving door of executives," which makes it difficult for local staff to keep up with
business operations. BYHAM, supra note 39, at 17. Likewise, another observer discusses rota-
tion of managers as a source of discontinuity and a lack of direction among the local staff.
Mullen, supra note 6, at 778. Virtually all rotating managers are men. Lantos Hearings,
supra note 30, at 160.
43. Tomoko Hamada observes a steady increase of Japanese businessmen accepting
transfers to overseas assignments. In 1986 alone, for instance, 58,951 Japanese transferred to
foreign branches or subsidiaries. Hamada further notes: "[A]lready about two million Japa-
nese businessmen and their families have been transplanted into foreign countries by Japa-
nese companies. About a quarter million come to the United States." Hamada, supra note 7,
at 136. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) explained:
"[T]he ability of Japanese investors to dispatch executive employees from Japan to manage
and control their overseas subsidiaries is of the greatest importance and indeed is a basic
prerequisite for the successful management of their overseas business activities." Amicus
Brief of MITI at 5, Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). See also
KAORU KOBAYASHI, THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD COUNTRY 99 (1984) (discussing job rotation
as a common method for Japanese firms to train managers to become generalists rather than
specialists).
44. Mroczkowski & Linowes, supra note 12, at 29. One author discusses his observation
of the staffing pattern at Mitsubishi International Corporation, a New York subsidiary of
Mitsubishi Shoji, a major Japanese trading company. Although Americans comprise 75% of
its employees, most of them engage in menial tasks as assistants for Japanese expatriates.
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include "strong control from headquarters and a mentality that makes a
clear distinction between insiders and outsiders - between Japanese at
the core of the firm and foreigners at the periphery."'
For example, Yap v. Sumitomo Corp. of America"' arose over such a
rotation system. Defendant (SCOA) is the wholly-owned American sub-
sidiary of a major Japanese trading company, Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha,
Ltd."' SCOA systematically assigned Japanese males rotated from the
parent company to managerial positions."" Non-Japanese plaintiffs
He further notes a similar practice at Toyota in the U.S.: while Americans occupy the ma-
jority of executive positions, they only maintain inflated titles. As in the previous example,
expatriates retain the real decision-making power. HORI, supra note 18, at 228-29. One ob-
server describes a "dual administrative structure" typical in manufacturing and trading
companies: "Japanese at the top, coordinating with Tokyo head office and making decisions,
and local staff below responsible for operations." MARCH, supra note 41, at 115. "Japanese
companies like to control overseas operations closely, and many Japanese managers admit
that Tokyo gives them little freedom to act autonomously . . . . [Miajor and minor policy
decisions often are made at headquarters." BYHAM, supra note 39, at 91. Statistical surveys
in the U.S., Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region have affirmed ethnic homogeneity of Japa-
nese management from a comparative perspective as well. "[C]lose to 70% of middle/senior
managers in Japanese firms abroad are Japanese, a marked contrast to American and Euro-
pean multinationals abroad, where only 10% of the same group come from the home coun-
try. As for the CEOs of overseas subsidiaries, virtually 100% are home country (i.e., Japa-
nese) nationals in the Japanese case, contrasted to 75% being home country nationals with
European subsidiaries, and 50% with U.S. subsidiaries abroad." MARCH, supra note 41, at
163.
45. This observation is based on a report by the Japan Economic Institute, funded by
the Japanese Foreign Ministry. MARCH, supra note 41, at 118-19. The Japanese refer to
subsidiaries as ko-gaisha (child company) in relation to oya-gaisha (parent company). These
terms suggest "the existence of a familial relationship of control and dependency." Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F.Supp. 1322, 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing K. HArrANI,
THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 126 (1976)). John Horton,
Manager of Administration at Toyota Technical Center U.S.A., Inc. explains the dual man-
agement structure he has observed at the company: non-Japanese employees with allegedly
management responsibilities must report to a parallel Japanese national manager. Lantos
Hearings, supra note 30, at 191. Likewise, Judy Teller and Russel Goyette point to the
practice of operating with a double standard by their former employer, DCA Advertising:
one for the Japanese and the other for Americans. Id. at 24 & 31. Teller explained: "It was
actually the stated policy of Japanese management that they could not treat the two groups
alike." Id. at 24. Attorney Lewis Steel has observed a three-tiered structure in Japanese
multinational firms: rotating staff from parent companies dominating the managerial posi-
tions, local male employees in the middle, and women at the bottom. Id. at 159. "With some
notable exceptions such as Sony and Nissan, centralized control from Tokyo and reliance on
Japanese managers to enforce it is still the pattern among many Japanese corporations."
Mroczkowski & Linowes, supra note 12, at 28 (1990). Tomoko Hamada agrees with this view
and asserts that "the Japanese firms" approach to mutinationalization derives from and is
an extension of the interorganizational alliance between relational dynamics of the parent
firm and its subsidiaries in Japan." Hamada, supra note 7, at 139. See also Perkins, supra
note 41 (observing heavy reliance by Japanese firms on expatriates who can communicate
with headquarters "through a common language, culture, and way of thinking").
46. Yap v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, No. 88 Civ. 700 (LBS), 1991 WL 29112
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1991).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id.
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claimed discrimination on the basis of national origin in hiring, promo-
tion, and compensation policies. 9 The U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York approved a proposed consent decree which
aimed at the greater use of the local staff in the senior management
group. The decree committed SCOA, among others, to provide a variety
of programs such as on-the-job training, career counseling, and manage-
ment training sessions.5 0
A practice revealed in EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc.s1 provides a
vivid and well-documented example of discriminatory hiring. In this case,
Recruit, a Japanese job placement agency in California, used a code sys-
tem to maintain a job candidate pool accommodating its clients' ages, as
well as their racial, ethnic, and gender preferences.52 Recruit used com-
mon names to denote race and gender; 3 for instance, the phrase Talk to
Adam when coding a request by an employer seeking male applicants and
Talk to Eve for female applicants. 5 IBM Japan, one of Recruit's clients,
49. Id.
50. Id. at *3.
51. EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 748 n.1; Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 43 (a statement by Paul
Schmidtberger that anywhere from 5 to 10 per 100 applications would be of "incorrect race"
while more than that would be of "incorrect gender").
53. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d., at 748 n.1; Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 7.
Former Recruit employee Paul Schmidtberger stated that the firm's screening process would
have forced him to screen out his own application despite his qualifications, including de-
grees from Yale University and Stanford Law School and fluency in Japanese. Lantos Hear-
ings, supra note 30, at 42. Fumihiro Sasaki, Sub-Chief of the Legal Department at Recruit
U.S.A., Inc. (hereinafter Recruit) views the firm's settlement with the EEOC as a mere com-
promise. Most of all, Recruit was concerned for publicized charges of its alleged discrimina-
tory practices. KISHI, supra note 30, at 130-36. On April 26, 1989, and May 2, 1989, the San
Francisco Chronicle published two articles, one on the company's coding system and the
other on the internal memorandum indicating IBM Japan's request for excluding non-Ori-
ental applicants. These articles were based on information provided by former employees,
including Paul Schmidtberger, who testified at a Lantos Hearing. By the time of his resigna-
tion, Schmidtberger had obtained corporate documents regarding Recruit's charges. He re-
fused to return them despite the company's plea and submitted them to the EEOC. Lantos
Hearings, supra note 30, at 42. On May 26, 1989, shortly after the San Francisco Chronicle
published the articles, R. Gaull Silberman of the EEOC charged Recruit with violation of
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The EEOC then obtained prelim-
inary injunction prohibiting the company from destroying or removing the records beyond
territorial discriminatory practices. At the appellate level, Recruit challenged this injunctive
relief; it claimed that the EEOC violated Title VII's confidentiality provisions by issuing a
press release and lifting the seal on the complaint and appended charges. The Ninth Circuit
however, justified the EEOC's act, considering substantial public interest involved. See
EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1991). In an interview with a Japanese
journalist, Fumihiro Sasaki of Recruit expressed his discontent with the outcome of the
case. Sasaki explained: "Because Schmidtberger was unsatisfied with his salary, he left the
job, stealing a substantial amount of internal documents, and revealed them at the Lantos
Hearing. We found it difficult to defend ourselves, because the court focused on the discrim-
ination issues instead of violation of confidentiality provisions." KISHI, supra note 30, at
131.
54. Similarly, Recruit used "Talk to Haruo" for Japanese men; "Talk to Mariko" for
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explicitly stated its preferences for job candidates: "Foreigners are no
good"; "White people, black people, no; but second generation Japanese
or others of Asian descent, OK." 65 For Meiko Securities, another client,
Recruit ordered a candidate pool with a male to female ratio of four to
one. 6 The settlement with the EEOC required the company to establish a
$100,000 fund to be distributed among victims of discrimination and to
provide training seminars which educate Japanese managers coming to
the U.S. about American antidiscrimination laws.
67
To take another example, the Daiichi Kangyo Bank in California,
which possesses the world's largest banking assets,58 allegedly conducted
racially-motivated hiring. Karl Joachim Biniarz, former president and
manager of the Bank's San Diego branch, testified about an instruction
he had received from a Japanese senior executive: to have a "proper pro-
file," meaning "no women or blacks," for a loan officer position."
Moreover, Robert Cole and Donald Deskins researched site selection
patterns by Japanese auto manufacturers in the U.S. 6° Questions arose
over hiring practices by Honda of America Manufacturing Inc. at its man-
ufacturing facilities in Marysville, Ohio. In 1977, Honda established its
original hiring radius as twenty miles.6 " Consequently, merely 2.8% of
Honda's workforce consisted of blacks although blacks accounted for
10.5% of the population at the Marysvile site.6" In 1984, then EEOC
Japanese women; "Maria" for Hispanic women; and "Maryanne" for black women. The
code was further used to accommodate employers' age preferences. For instance, "Suite 20
through 35" meant age twenty to thirty-five. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d.at 748, n.1;
Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 7.
55. This memorandum written in Japanese, "IBM Project Confirmation," was submit-
ted to the Lantos Committee along with Paul Schmidtberger's statement. Paul
Schmidtberger testified that the memo was taped to the wall of the Recruit office. Lantos
Hearings, supra note 30, at 8.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 2.
58. The Greenlining Coalition notes that among the world's 20 largest banks listed in
the American Banker, the top six are Japanese, and seven of the top 10 are Japanese. The
top six banks and their asset size from the previous year are as follows: (1) Dai-ichi Kangyo
Bank ($428.2 billion); (2) Sumitomo Bank Ltd. ($409.2 billion); (3) Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank
Ltd. ($408.8 billion); (4) Sanwa Bank Ltd. ($402.7 billion); (5) Fuji Bank Ltd. ($399.5 bil-
lion); and (6) Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. ($391.5 billion). Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 328.
59. According to Biniarz, after the Bank fired two Filipino-American employees, a Jap-
anese official said that Filipinos tend to be lazy. Biniarz claims that he himself was involun-
tarily terminated. Id. at 201-203.
60. Robert E. Cole & Donald R. Deskins, Jr., Racial Factors in Site Location and Em-
ployment Patterns of Japanese Auto Firms in America, 31 CAL. MGMT. REv. 9 (1988).
61. For its decision to choose the Marysvile site, Honda of America pointed to several
reasons, such as active encouragement from the state of Ohio and superior access to the
interstate highway system. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 127-28. The company en-
larged its hiring radius to 30 miles in 1986 and even further in 1987. Id. at 128.
62. Cole & Deskins, supra note 60, at 15. EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp discussed a
geographical factor that may have affected hiring practices by Japanese employers. Japanese
multinational firms would be expected to locate where tax and wage rates remain relatively
low; many of minority groups are, however, located where tax and wage rates are high.
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Chairman Clarance Thomas filed a charge against Honda for discrimina-
tion against women and blacks in hiring and promotion and against non-
Japanese in engineering positions.63 Refusing to accept the charges,
Honda officials had repeated talks with the EEOC for four years.6 At
last, on March 24, 1988, Honda agreed to give 370 blacks and women a
total of six million dollars in back pay.65 In response to the EEOC charge,
Honda evaluated its hiring patterns and began what it calls "corrective
hiring."66
Cole and Deskins also published an article which analyzed the more
general tendency of Japanese manufacturers to select areas with a low
black population.6" For this purpose, they cited an interview with Dennis
Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 64.
63. Id. at 128 & 134.
64. Kunio Iwamoto, former Vice President of Honda who dealt with this case, insists
that the firm's choice of the hiring radius was not intended to exclude certain applicants.
Iwamoto speaks with confidence of Honda's equal employment opportunity policy which he
says the company adopted long before the EEOC's charge was filed. He explains that the
firm was hoping to help reduce a high unemployment rate within that radius by hiring as
many locals as possible. In fact, Iwamoto says, Honda received about 30,000 applications
constantly. KISHI, supra note 30, at 138-142.
65. Cole & Deskins, supra note 60, at 9 (citing Micel McQueen & Joseph White,
Blacks, Women at Honda Unit Win Back Pay, WALL ST. J., March 24, 1988).
66. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 134. Instead of simply expanding the hiring ra-
dius, Honda adopted a new policy of recruiting from a larger area including the neighboring
counties. In addition, the company implemented and carried out five new policies: (1) to
place newspaper advertisements stating that Honda does not discriminate; (2) to ask minor-
ity organizations to recommend prospective employees; (3) to conduct career guidance at
colleges for blacks throughout the U.S.; (4) to educate Honda managers on the U.S. antidis-
crimination laws and civil rights issues; and (5) to emphasize the importance of equal em-
ployment opportunity to all workers through President's speeches and so forth. KIsHI, supra
note 30, at 140. Iwamoto sees the company's settlement as a mere compromise. Iwamoto
made the following statement in his interview with Nagami Kishi, a management specialist
who surveyed employment discrimination cases against Japanese firms in the U.S.: "Since
we expanded to the U.S. in 1959, we have operated our business, based on our attorneys'
advice. In fact, we were confident that our company had taken root in American society...
[h]owever, the EEOC expected greater social responsibility from us because of our rapid
growth and prominence." Id. at 142. At a Lantos Hearing, Honda emphasized its effort to
promote women and blacks by reporting an increase of women and blacks in what they call
"production associates:" "From March 1984 to March 1988 employment of female produc-
tion associates rose from 12.5% to 25.8%; and black production associates from 1.2% to
2.8%." Nonetheless, Lantos questioned the company's definition of "associates," which
proved to be production line workers or assembly line workers. In fact, in Honda's upper-
level management, 7% were women and there was only one black (out of about 150). Lantos
Hearings, supra note 30, at 135. Based on his interview, Robert March introduces the fol-
lowing information on the "ostensible" behavior of Japanese managers at Honda in
Marysville:
"[t]he Japanese in Marysville put more emphasis on communal living Japanese-style and
reinforcing their common links with one another, than on adjusting to the new environment
... [w]ouldn't it be nice to be back home? They would say to each other when relaxing.
Having farewell parties (sobetsukai) and singing karaoke together seemed to be the things
they talked about most, or had written about." MARCH, supra note 41, at 201.
67. Cole & Deskins, supra note 60, at 13.
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Des Rosiers, who had performed several site studies for Japanese auto
companies."8 These employers, Des Rosiers says, scrutinize profiles of the
community extensively "by ethnic background, by religious background,
[and] by professional makeup."' 9
Likewise, it has been discovered that Japanese investors in the U.S.
receive detailed census tract information from the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO).70 One JETRO publication was found to recom-
mend California to site plants because of its higher Asian population, a
potential source of "high quality" human resources.
1 1
B. Discrimination in Assignment and Promotion
At Japanese multinational firms, local employees often find them-
selves trapped in job duties with minimal delegated authority. 2 The
Greenlining Coalition, a California organization composed of minority
groups and consumers, criticized the hiring pattern at the Mitsui Taiyo
Kobe Bank, a bank with an asset base of $408.8 billion.7s In its 1990 An-
nual Report, all 103 members of Board of Directors are Japanese males.7 4
The twenty-two Advisory Board members and fourteen key or "Senior
Managing Directors" are all Japanese males who are at least fifty-eight
years old. Moreover, the top ninety-seven management persons are all
Japanese males. The Coalition discussed the adverse impact of such ho-
mogeneous workforce in California, a state of diverse individuals includ-
ing 13.5 million people of color and 8.35 million white women.7 5
68. Id. at 17 (citing Doug Williamson, Japanese Bias Comes to Light in Hiring Plans,
WINDSOR STAR SPECIAL RPT.: JOBS 2000, October 29, 1987, at 14).
69. Japanese employers try to find out, for instance, a ratio of accountants to farmers in
the area. Also, the employers prefer a high German content, due to their positive stereo-
types about Germans, such as having a good work ethic. Id. at 17-18.
70. Id. at 18. Established in 1958 by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, JETRO performs a broad array of activities, such as import promotion and liaison
between small businesses in Japan and their foreign counterparts. Dick K. Nanto, in JAPAN:
A COUNTRY STUDY 203 (Frederica M. Bunge, ed., 1981).
71. Cole & Deskins, supra note 60, at 18.
72. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 158-62. At Nissan America, Japanese managers
"assist in the planning and checking of department activities, with the American staff carry-
ing out and adjusting day-to-day operations." MARCH, supra note 41, at 17-18 (citing The
International Herald Tribune, May 24, 1990). Lawyer Lewis Steel describes a three-tiered
structure he has observed within those firms: Japanese nationals rotated from parent com-
panies dominating the managerial positions, "even down to the lowest level of manage-
ment;" locally-hired men at the middle level with limited chance for promotion; and women
at the bottom, providing support services. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 158-62. Chet
Mackentire, former employee of Ricoh, explains that Japanese nationals occupied virtually
all the firm's division heads throughout the U.S. Company representatives pointed to two
reasons: "One, each division has profit and loss responsibility to the mother company in
Japan; and two, they need division heads who they can rely on." Id. at 209.
73. Id. at 331.
74. Id. at 328.
75. Id. at 329. "As a result [of its discriminatory practices], Mitsui's all Japanese male
control from Tokyo is unable to understand the marketing, lending and service needs of
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In Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank7 6 four women sued their former em-
ployer, Mitsubishi Bank's New York Office (Mitsubishi), alleging discrim-
ination based on their non-Oriental status. Plaintiffs asserted that they
were hired as analysts but were actually confined in positions as adminis-
trative assistants.7 7 Mistubishi maintained a "dual staff system," includ-
ing rotating staff (executive and managerial employees from the head of-
fice in Japan on assignments of limited duration) and local staff
(individuals who were hired locally). Plaintiffs described the gap between
these two as one which "significantly impeded the ability of local staff at
all levels to achieve promotions or salary increases." ''" Only twenty officer
positions were allocated to local staff, as compared to fifty-five officer po-
sitions to rotating staff; of the twenty officers among local staff, only one
involved a position higher than the first level of assistant manager; more-
over, of the top nineteen positions, eighteen were held by Japanese rotat-
ing staffZ" The court denied Mitsubishi's motion for summary judgment.
Some employers give inflated job titles to local employees while forc-
ing them to report to a Japanese "shadow manager" who retains the deci-
sion-making power.80 The Daiichi-Kangyo Bank, for instance, gave "no
authority whatsoever" to a former vice president and manager of its San
Diego office without receiving approval from a Japanese expatriate
through the head office in Los Angeles.8"
Furthermore, at Toyota Technical Center (TTC), John Horton, a
middle management employee of ten and a half years, alleged a discrimi-
natory barrier at the firm."' TTC's top management denied Horton's pro-
motion twice in 1990 despite the exemplary performance appraisals he
America's most diverse business culture and California's 700 billion-dollar economy." Id. at
331. The Coalition compares Mitsui's discriminatory hiring pattern with fair employment
practice at the Bank of Tokyo's Union Bank, another Japanese bank located in California.
Union Bank has successfully promoted its comprehensive equal employment opportunity
policy since 1988. The Coalition commends the Bank's effort in achieving its goal that
women and people of color will occupy 60% of the new senior management appointments.
Id. at 330.
76. Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
77. Id. at 1551-51.
78. Id. at 1552.
79. The Bank did not contest these figures. However, it denied that any specific posi-
tions were allocated to the rotating staff. Id.
80. MARCH, supra note 41, at 165. See also Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 161
(noting that business transactions by local staff are often subject to approval by Japanese
employees even if they possess limited knowledge or skills in that particular field); id. at 168
(observing that some Japanese firms refer to clerical employees as officials and managers to
make it appear that they ensure fair employment).
81. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 201-2.
82. Horton's job title is manager of administration. Horton is in charge of purchasing,
import and export, and facilities. He calls himself "one of only very few Americans at the
management level although none of [them] has advanced beyond middle management." Ap-
proximately 20 employees above middle management are all Japanese citizens although, in
Horton's view, some of them are less qualified than the U.S. citizens in middle management
positions. Id. at 188-89.
VOL. 24:1
JAPANESE COMPANIES
had received on a constant basis.88 On both occasions, he observed that
the positions went to Japanese nationals while no consideration was given
to Americans.84 Horton calls TTC a rotating training ground for Japanese
expatriates which prevents qualified Americans from advancing.85
C. Discrimination in Salary and Compensation
Some have questioned a disparity in salary and compensation be-
tween Japanese and American employees. Judy Teller, former employee
of DCA Advertising (DCA), a wholly owned subsidiary of Dentsu Inc., a
Tokyo-based advertising and communications company, alleged that
DCA provided material benefits exclusively for its Japanese employees.88
These included "cars, generous housing allowances, tuition for their chil-
dren, [and] a double bonus system by which they were rewarded for the
same work efforts."8 Moreover, Teller said, for Japanese expatriates, the
firm incurred expenses for a university English immersion program of
several months.88 In contrast, for American employees studying Japanese,
DCA only paid up to half tuition for once-a-week language classes, the
actual amount depending on the grade received. 8 Notwithstanding lack
of educational opportunities, the company massively dismissed Ameri-
cans, claiming their positions required fluency in Japanese.90
The Sanwa Bank, the world's fifth largest bank and the twelfth larg-
est corporation in the world ranked by assets, allegedly reimbursed part
of tuition for employees attending graduate school when they maintained
a rating of two or better.8 ' John L. Piechota, an American worker with
the highest rating, was expressly denied this benefit. Yukio Harada, his
manager, told him it was because "the Japanese have a job for life and
Americans don't."92 Harada even canceled Piechota's technical seminars
that had been approved and paid for; in contrast, Harada had constantly
allowed the Japanese in similar positions to take such seminars.93
83. Id. at 189-190.
84. Id. at 189.
85. Id. at 190 (noting TTC's periodical implementation of "new levels of authority to
insert between Horton's position and that of upper management so as to exclude [him and
other Americans] from competitive promotions and advancements").
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 24. Typically, salaries for Japanese employees include benefits such as hous-
ing, commuting, family, pension, health plan, and the like. MARCH, supra note 41, at 112.
88. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 24.
89. Id.
90. Id. Teller further testified about the existence of double standards at DCA: one for
Japanese and the other for Americans. She added, "It was actually the stated policy of
Japanese management that they could not treat the two groups alike, and the difference was
patent in the way the two groups were treated." Id.
91. Id. at 213.
92. Under this policy, the company entirely reimbursed Kimisuke Fujimoto's education
at Stanford University. Id.
93. Id. at 218.
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D. Exclusion from the Decision-Making Process
Some American employees have allegedly been excluded from their
companies' communications and decision-making network.9 4 John Hor-
ton, a manager fluent in Japanese, asserted that his employer, TTC, or-
dered him not to speak Japanese in the workplace.98 The firm also pro-
hibited Japanese employees from speaking their language in his presence.
Horton argues that these rules were intended to exclude him from "con-
tact with all but a select group of company officials." 96
Similarly, some Japanese managers prevent American workers from
participating in after-work and weekend gatherings, where they exchange
vital business information.9 7 Both Nikko Securities and DCA Advertising
held those meetings exclusively for Japanese employees.9 At DCA, when
an American employee suggested including local staff in those functions,
he was expressly told that they were reserved for the Japanese. 9e
Piechota, former employee of Sanwa Bank, criticized weekly gatherings at
a California branch, which whites, blacks, or Hispanics were prohibited
from attending. 00 The participants, exclusively Japanese nationals, often
made important decisions at these meetings.1
0 °
E. Discrimination in Dismissal
Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc. 02 arose over the discharge of
twenty-three employees in September, 1990. At DCA Advertising,'s
twenty-two of the discharged employees were Americans; one of them was
a Japanese woman who had expressed her intent to retire.0"" Plaintiffs
alleged discrimination based on national origin discrimination. The court
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to the Title
VII intentional discrimination claim. 0 5 DCA's president, Toshio Naito,
94. A study affirms that Japanese managers are rarely active in improving communica-
tions between Japanese and American employees; they often fail to encourage language
study or to organize social activities including both Japanese and Americans. MARCH, supra
note 41, at 97.
95. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 196.
96. Id.
97. See BUHAM, supra note 39, at 17; Lincoln, supra note 29, at 94, 96 (introducing a
result of a comparative survey that Japanese employees are far more likely than Americans
to socialize after work).
98. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 19 & 25.
99. Id. at 25.
100. Id. at 213.
101. Id. (noting that whites, blacks, or Hispanics were prohibited to attend these
meetings).
102. Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc. 828 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
103. DCA Advertising is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese advertising agency.
Id.
104. Id. at 229.
105. "Retention by Japanese employer's executives indicating intent to discriminate
against American employees of subsidiary of Japanese corporation, reassignment of duties
to Japanese employees, and additional benefits provided to Japanese expatriates and Japa-
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had told Russell Goyette, former Vice President and one of the Ameri-
cans fired: "We have to treat Americans and Japanese differently. We
have to favor the Japanese."10 Another plaintiff, Judith Teller, asserted
that the firm dismissed many qualified and productive Americans while
guaranteeing the jobs of the Japanese, some of whom were "clearly
unqualified.
10 7
Examples of age discrimination are also plentiful. In July 1990,
Sanwa Bank California fired white, black, and Hispanic workers over the
age of forty; in contrast, it fired neither Japanese nationals nor Orientals.
Piechota claims that he was "physically removed from the property under
escort."10 Evidence clearly indicated that the discharge was not due to
economic reasons. 09 Similarly, in Kelly v. TYK Refractories Co.,'10 the
Third Circuit discussed, among other claims, wrongful discharge and re-
versed an award of summary judgment for TYK. Plaintiff served as the
Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice-President of TYK, a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Tokyo-based trading company. TYK allegedly gave
Kelly a discriminatory instruction: to discharge older employees and to
replace them with younger Japanese males.1
Lastly, Ricoh Corp., under its employee reduction plan of one hun-
dred people, exclusively laid off Americans in February, 1990.1" Nancy
Cosgrove, one of the employees laid off, summarized her observation of
Ricoh as follows: the firm had provided the "perfect environment for cov-
ert, insidious discrimination," which was "fraught with double standards
nese-Americans created factual issues precluding reason for discharges-reduction in force to
cut losses-was pretext for discrimination on basis of national origin and whether legitimate
motives played role in discharges." Id. at 228.
106. This quote derives from Naito's response to Goyette, who complained about dis-
charge to Naito and asked him for alternative employment with the company's affiliate. Id.
at 230.
107. In March of 1990, Teller received a performance review by Kiyoshi Eguchi, DCA's
general manager. Her overall work was rated four or "exceeds standards" on a scale of one
to five. Id. at 231. DCA retained Japanese employees in Teller's department although they
were arguably less qualified than Teller. For instance, it retained Hiroaki Yamada, a Japa-
nese expatriate, who was considered incompetent. Id. Also, evidence suggests that Goyette
was qualified for his position. Id. at 233. See also Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 25
(Judith Teller discussing an example of a Japanese employee who spent a year in his private
New York office "reading the newspaper and that was his activity, at full pay, approxi-
mately $100,000 per year . ..").
108. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 214. Piechota had received the highest rating
possible in his performance review. He also claims that he put in 938 hours of authorized
but uncompensated overtime in two years. Id. at 212.
109. According to a 1990 annual report, the Bank's profits more than doubled from the
previous year, which was a record high since the Bank was formed in 1972. The same report
also shows an increase of stockholder equity by 19%. Furthermore, its parent company,
Sanwa Bank Ltd., had the highest profits in its history as well as the second highest profits
of any other bank in Japan. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 214.
110. Kelly v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 1190.
112. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 41.
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for Japanese personnel, Americans, men and women." ' s
F. Sex Discrimination
Japanese firms typically assign their female employees to clerical or
administrative positions with little chance for promotion." As civil rights
attorney Lewis Steel has observed, college-educated women may find
themselves trapped in what he calls a glorified secretarial role, although
performing vital aspects of business transactions, they are generally re-
ferred to as secretaries and paid accordingly.
1 5
In Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,1 6 a landmark case
which will be analyzed in a later section of this article, female secretaries
of a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary challenged the firm's practice of
reserving managerial posts for male Japanese nationals.
Also, at Nikko Securities, only one thirty-forth of the managerial
posts was held by a woman. "' Susan Minshkin, former employee of
Nikko, testified about various forms, both overt and subtle, of gender dis-
crimination. " 8 Minshkin was hired as an administrative assistant, the en-
try level professional position for college graduates; those positions were
entirely composed of women.11 9 On the other hand, a man whose qualifi-
cations were nearly identical to Minshkin's was hired as a sales trainee, a
higher level position. 2 ' The company also required seven years of work
before promoting women to the level of assistant vice president, the low-
est officer level; it required less than two years for men. 2 ' The company
113. Nancy Cosgrove, one of the employees laid off, points to the following as the rea-
sons for her discharge: her filing complaint with the Division of Civil Rights; her litigation
against Ricoh; and her decreased workload due to her pregnancy. Id.
114. Id. at 158. Today 37% of managers in the U.S. are women; the comparable figure
in Japan is 2%. BYHAM, supra note 39, at 176-78. For a discussion of gender discrimination
in Japan and the limited effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, see generally
Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Still Office Flowers: Japanese Women Betrayed by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Law, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming May 1995).
115. Steel further notes a recent increase of Asian-born (mainly from Japan, Korea,
and the Philippines) female employees hired by Japanese firms. In his view, this practice
reflects employers' belief that Asian women are much less likely to protest unfair treatment
than Caucasian women. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 162.
116. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
117. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 140. See also Ross v. Nikko Sec., 53 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). However, Nikko Securities (hereinafter "Nikko")
justified this disproportionate figure as simply the results of the hiring. Evan Steward, Gen-
eral Counsel of Nikko, emphasized the firm's effort in active hiring and promoting women.
Tom Lantos nevertheless expressed his skepticism about this statement, pointing to the
statistical disparity between men and women at the managerial level. Lantos Hearings,
supra note 30, at 140.
118. Lantos Hearing, supra note 30, at 18-20.
119. Id. at 18.
120. He also received a higher rate of pay than any of the other women who had al-
ready been promoted two levels above him and others with equal qualifications, including
women who were employed as administrative assistants and secretaries. Id.
121. Id. at 19.
VOL. 24:1
JAPANESE COMPANIES
required all women, including professionals, to fill in for the receptionist
during the lunch break; no men were required to do the same.
1 2 2
Minshkin further alleged that "[s]ingle women were frequently asked
about their future marriage plan, on one hand as encouragement to mar-
riage, on the other to assess when the women would be leaving the
company." '
III. DISCRIMINATION CHARGES FROM THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE
A. Claims of Bias Suits
Some observers, both Japanese and Americans, have equated mount-
ing criticism against Japanese employment practices with racism. For in-
stance, some challenge what they call an anti-Japan policy advocated by
the Clinton administration; according to their view, this policy has forced
the EEOC to scrutinize and focus public attention on hiring practices by
Japanese firms.""' One Japanese scholar expresses a similar view in his
observation of the Lantos Hearings; Professor Yoshihiro Tsurumi of Ba-
ruch College, City University of New York, called the hearings "a witch-
hunt inquisition" which was "one-sided and isolated tales of woe" from
"disgruntled individuals."12 5
Testifying before the Lantos Committee, the EEOC Chairman Evan
Kemp refused to declare Japanese employers more discriminatory than
their U.S. counterparts. 2 6 In 1990, the EEOC received nearly 60,000 dis-
crimination charges; 12 7 among this figure, the Commission identified 115
charges against 35 Japanese firms in the U.S. 2 ' Kemp described the
number of charges and lawsuits against Japanese employers as an "ex-
tremely small universe," cautioning the risk of drawing a specific conclu-
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Zaibei Nikkei Kigyo Ijime ga Hajimaru? [Japanese-Firm Bashing Has Begun in
the U.S.?], SANDEI MAINICHI, June 12, 1994, at 120-21. Kilbert, Tallent, and Agawa, lawyers
and co-editors of the book entitled Pitfalls for Japanese Employers in the United States,
expressly stated that so-called Japan bashing was the true motive behind the Lantos Hear-
ings. PITFALLS, supra note 8, at iii.
125. Kopp, supra note 18, at 19 (citing Yoshihiro Tsurumi, The Ghost of McCarthyism
Haunts Japanese Firms, PACIFIc BASIN Q. 15 (Summer/Fall 1991)).
126. In response to the Committee's request, Kemp presented some statistical evidence
regarding employment practice by Japanese companies in the U.S. At the beginning of his
testimony, however, Kemp explained the EEOC's reluctance to review particular employers
for closer scrutiny based on national origin. Doing so, he said, conflicts the EEOC's mission
"to enforce the laws against job discrimination fairly and even handedly without regard to
the factors that we tell employers to ignore, including national origin." Lantos Hearings,
supra note 30, at 63-71. See also KISHI, supra note 30, at 107-14 (providing general informa-
tion on the EEOC's functions).
127. There were precisely 59,426 charges. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 65.
128. Among the charges against Japanese employers, 37% alleged race discrimination,
34% sex discrimination, 29% age discrimination, and 14% national origin discrimination.
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sion. 2 9 Furthermore, referring to Recruit's illegal use of codes to screen
out minorities,' Kemp pointed to about three hundred charges currently
filed against American companies, which have also used codes on job or-
der forms.'
In their study on minority hiring by Honda Motor Company, 13 Cole
and Deskins noted that Japanese auto manufacturers are not more dis-
criminatory than the U.S. counterparts. According to them, the practices
by Japanese employers are more visible because they are inexperienced in
disguising such practices and have no reservations talking about race.'88
Rochelle Kopp, Principal of Japan Intercultural Consulting, agrees
that lawsuits involving Japanese multinational firms often invite more
media coverage than they deserve, "simply because they involve Japanese
firms."' s4 Kopp points out that some plaintiffs may see their Japanese
employers as "deep-pocketed and vulnerable" and thus bring frivolous
lawsuits. 88 She further introduces a comment made by some defense law-
yers for Japanese firms: "many of [our] courtroom opponents are extor-
tionists who threaten to whip the jury into a Japan-bashing frenzy if they
aren't offered a handsome settlement.' 8 6
In fact, some courts have flatly rejected plaintiffs' discrimination
claims and granted summary judgments for Japanese corporate defend-
ants. Walsh v. Eagle Wings Industries, Inc.3 7 provides one example in
which the court found each of the allegations wholly unsupported. The
defendant (hereinafter "EWI") is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japa-
nese corporation. Walsh's allegations against EWI included the firm's re-
fusal to give him the same relocation benefits as those given to Japanese
employees, refusal to allow him to take language classes comparable to
those offered to Japanese employees, and providing company-sponsored
outings solely to Japanese employees.' The U.S. District Court for Cen-
tral District of Illinois found none of these claims factually supported and
granted a summary judgment accordingly. For instance, written docu-
129. Nevertheless, Kemp discussed some general observations on Japanese companies.
For instance, he testified that Japanese companies tend to hire a higher percentage of Asian
or Pacific Islanders than other companies. The EEOC found that Asians and Pacific Island-
ers accounted for 13% of the workforce at Japanese firms, compared to 2.6% of all other
companies surveyed. Id. at 64. Other authors cited Kemp's testimony, stating: "This testi-
mony must have disappointed the Lantos Committee which originally aimed at Japan bas-
ing." PITFALLS, supra note 8, at iii.
130. For a summary of this case, see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
131. Kemp added that litigation is pending against some American employers in North
Carolina and New York. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 71.
132. See supra note 60.
133. Lansing & Domeyer, supra note 24, at 153 (citing Cole & Deskins, supra note 60,
at 18).
134. Kopp, supra note 18, at 21.
135. Id. at 241.
136. Id. (citing Mark Thompson, Japan Inc. on Trial, Cal. Lawyer 44 (May 1989).
137. Walsh v. Eagle Wings Industries, Inc., No.89-2052, 1991 WL 90906 (C.D.lll. 1991).
138. Id. at *1.
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ments revealed that the relocation policy for Japanese employees was in-
deed more restrictive than the one given to Walsh."'9 Likewise, Walsh was
"unable to adduce even the slightest proof' that company had sponsored
recreation and excursion trips exclusively for its Japanese employees.'"
The court found it undisputed that EWI had offered such activities for all
employees and Walsh had never been refused admission.14 1 Walsh, how-
ever, assumed that he had been excluded, simply because he had seen
only Japanese participants or because he had seen a sign advertising the
trips in Japanese. " .
Similarly, in Bagnell v. Komatsu Dresser Co., 45 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois condemned the terminated
American employee's attempt to "portray a well-orchestrated conspiracy
to remove him because of his U.S. origin and to replace him with a Japa-
nese person."' "4 Confronted with the discrimination charge, Komatsu
Dresser (KD) based its reason for firing Bangnell on his expense account
falsifications on numerous occasions.'" Bagnell's job as a sales manager
had constantly kept him on the road and required him to keep records of
the expenses incurred so that he could be reimbursed by KD." 6 The
questionable practices ranged from "padded expenses (such as a receipt
altered to reflect an amount more than six times the actual charge)" to
"double submission of the same receipt, as though two separate charges
were involved."'4 7 The court agreed that these repeated inaccuracies qual-
ified as a legitimate good faith reason for the termination. 4 8 Bagnell fur-
ther failed to establish that the same degree of deception would have
been tolerated in non-American employees.'4  The court was not reluc-
tant to express its frustration when it stated: "[i]t would take pages to
address each of the gossamer strands from which Bagnell seeks to weave
his imaginary conspirational web. In candor, the trip is simply not worth
it. ' 'l50 Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for KD.1'5




143. Bangnell v. Komatsu Dresser Co., 838 F.Supp. 1279 (N.D.ll. 1993).
144. Id. at 1288-89.
145. Id. at 1284.
146. Id. at 1281.
147. Id. at 1284. In one instance, Bagnell reported an expense of $95.00 from the Mari-
ott Windows, Columbus, Ohio. The hotel, however, faxed a copy of a receipt for two break-
fast buffets at a cost of $14.70. The company was also concerned about other instances
"where service establishment identification had been torn off, dates had been altered and a
$91.59 charge had been reported for drinks at a golf outing that Grzelak (who was in attend-
ance) did not recollect Bagnell purchasing." Id. at 1281-82.
148. Id. at 1284.
149. Id. at 1288-89.
150. Id. at 1289. The court further stated: "[niothing indicates that anything was at
work other than a desire to rid the company of an employee ... who had ... proved in his
boss' judgment to be cheating regularly on his expense account." Id. at 1290. Moreover, the
court rejected Bagnell's allegation that KD had breached his employment contract in dis-
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These two cases cannot be the sole depiction of bias suits against
Japanese corporations. Nonetheless, they do suggest the possibility that
some Americans may attempt to fabricate a race or national origin dis-
crimination theory against their Japanese employers.
B. Anti-Japanese Sentiment in the U.S.
Among the American public, feelings of resentment against the Japa-
nese have grown stronger as the trade deficit mounts.15 Consequently,
some Americans may hold an overly hostile view of vigorous economic
activities by Japanese investors. 153 The following tragedy highlighted
growing tensions between Japan and the United States: in 1982, two laid-
off auto workers (a father and his stepson) in Detroit, Michigan, ex-
pressed their frustration toward the Japanese when they brutally mur-
dered Vincent Chen, a Chinese American.1 5 4 Ronald Ebens, the father,
yelled at Chin, "It's because of you . . . that we're out of work." As one
author noted, the killers "transferred blame not only from the Japanese
government to the Japanese people, not only from the Japanese people to
United States citizens of Japanese descent, but finally from Japanese
Americans to anyone unlucky enough to bear Asian features."' 5
The hostility, often known as Japan-bashing, further intensified dur-
ing the late 1980s.1 1' In 1987, the Harvard Business Review published an
article entitled Only Retaliation Will Open Up Japan in an "almost war-
like tone:1' 57 "To hit the deficit where it hurts us most, we need a target
rifle, not a shotgun."5 ' In the same year, Japan faced a "political
charging him. The company's employee handbook cautions that it does not constitute a
contract. Also, the handbook clearly articulates its policy that "falsification of company
records subjects an employee to termination without notice." Id. at 1291.
151. Id. at 1291.
152. Katayama, supra note 18, at 8 (noting that Japan's trade surplus with the rest of
the world exceeded $100 billion in 1992); Ronald C. Brown, The Faces of Japanese Labor
Relations in Japan and the U.S. and the Emerging Legal Issues under U.S. Labor Laws,
15 SY. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 232 (1989) (discussing political, economical, social, and legal
effects of Japan's high trade deficit, which amounted to $60 billion in 1987). See also Mul-
len, supra note 6, at 756-57 (providing various examples of how Americans have harbored
negative views of the Japanese).
153. In 1992, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan amounted to $49 billion. In the
same year, Japan's trade surplus with other nations exceeded $100 billion. Katayama, supra
note 18, at 8. One observer commented: "Americans tend to ignore the fact that Britain has
more money invested in the United States and Canada controls 26 percent of all foreign
owned real estate compared to 15 percent control rate for Japan. However, when these
countries are investing in the United States, we do not say too much; it is only when Japan
enters the picture that Americans start to get riled up." Lansing & Domeyer, supra note 24,
at 154.
154. U.S. v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986).
155. Note, Racial Violence against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1928
(1993).
156. TOKoMo HAMADA, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 2 (1991).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Robert T. Green & Trina L. Larsen, Only Retaliation Will Open Up
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firestorm" in the U.S: Japan's breach of an international agreement was
revealed. " Japan's Toshiba Machine Company had sold prohibited mili-
tary technology to the then Soviet Union; this had enabled the Soviets to
build submarines with quiet propellers, undetectable by acoustic devices
the U.S. had strategically placed on the ocean floor. 160 The estimated cost
of damages done to the U.S. exceeded thirty billion dollars.' 6 ' An anti-
Japan movement spread in various forms, ranging from banning the sale
of Toshiba products to smashing a Toshiba cassette player with
sledgehammers on the grounds of the Capitol. 6 '
As these incidents suggest, the current anti-Japanese atmosphere
gives Japanese firms even more compelling reasons to prevent discrimina-
tion charges. 63 Experts predict a continued rise in Title VII litigation
against Japanese firms. 6 4 In general, explosion of litigation has plagued
both domestic and foreign employers across the United States; the num-
ber of discrimination suits has skyrocketed by more than twenty-two
times over the past two decades. 16 5 In addition, a survey by the Japanese
Ministry of Labor reveals that fifty-seven percent of 331 Japanese firms
operating in the U.S. possibly face discrimination suits. 66 Over seventy
percent of the surveyed firms have urged the Ministry for advice on "how
to avoid 'unnecessary' trouble. ' 167 In other words, these employers them-
selves are now acutely aware of the need to implement defensive strate-
gies to insulate themselves against discrimination charges. Also impor-
tantly, American jurors in transnational litigation may be culturally
inclined to distrust Japanese corporate defendants. For all these reasons,
Japan, HARV. Bus. REV. 6:22-28 (Nov./Dec. 1987)).
159. Along with Toshiba, Norway's Kongsberg Vaapernfabrikk as well sold the same
kind of technology to Soviet. CHOATE, supra note 6, at 7.
160. "These Soviet submarines, loaded with multiple-warhead missiles, can now creep
undetected so close to the U.S. coast that they could destroy most of America's strategic
arsenal before it could be launched." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Street, supra note 28, at 387 & 401.
164. The factors behind the expected rise include the following: a greater number of
Americans working for Japanese companies; deterioration of economy; increase of layoffs
and discharge by Japanese companies; strained Japan-U.S. relationship; increase of labor
disputes in American society as a whole; media attention focused on business operations by
large Japanese corporations in the U.S. PITFALLS, supra note 8, at iii.
165. Jay Finegan's article explores employment litigation as an epidemic in American
society. Finegan notes that the number of current discrimination suits account for an esti-
mated one-fifth of all civil suits filed in U.S. courts. Jay Finegan, Law and Disorder, INC. 64
(Apr. 1994). The Newsweek magazine reports a sudden increase of sexual harassment com-
plaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: from 6,883 in fiscal year
1991 to more than 12,000 in 1993. "Money doled out to settle EEOC claims nearly doubled
as well, from $12.7 million in 1992 to $25.2 million last year." Seena Nayyar & Susan Miller,
Making It Easier to Strike Back, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1994, at 50.
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the employers should direct their efforts toward implementing preventive
strategies.
IV. TITLE VII DEFENSES FOR JAPANESE FIRMS
This section explores two primary defenses that Japanese firms have
asserted against discrimination charges, points out the limited scope of
these defenses and further emphasizes the necessity of adopting a new
employment policy intended to prevent disputes.
A. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty
1. Conflict between the FCN Treaty and Title VII
Some Japanese firms have invoked their Title VII immunity under
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. 168 The U.S. and Ja-
pan signed this commercial agreement in 1953 with an aim to "give cor-
porations of each signatory legal status in the territory of the other party,
and to allow them to conduct business in the other country on a compara-
ble basis with domestic firms." 169 Article VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty pro-
vides: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to en-
gage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other
technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other spe-
cialists of their choice. 1 70 This provision gives employers of both nations
hiring discretion to facilitate the staffing of overseas business opera-
tions.171 Some Japanese firms have asserted that the Treaty gives them
hiring preference for Japanese nationals within the managerial ranks.
However, such a hiring pattern inevitably results in discrimination on the
basis of national origin, which is expressly prohibited by Title VII.1 7 2 This
apparent conflict between the Treaty provision and Title VII has sparked
168. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063 [hereinafter FCN Treaty]. Since World War II, the U.S. signed friendship trea-
ties with more than two dozen nations. Abraham, supra note 7, at 485.
169. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano v. 457 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1982). The
Supreme Court further described the purpose of the FCN Treaty as "not to give foreign
corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead to assure them the right to
conduct business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination based on their alien-
age." Id. at 187-88.
170. FCN Treaty, supra note 168, at art. VIII(l), at 2070.
171. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d. 552, 554-55 (2nd Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
172. Title VII distinguishes citizenship from national origin and bans only discrimina-
tion based on the latter. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (distinguishing
national origin discrimination from citizenship discrimination). In Japan, however, citizen-
ship is virtually synonymous with national origin; those of Japanese origin make up ninety-
nine per cent of the nation's population. David T. Wilson, Foreign Owned Subsidiaries and
National Origin Discrimination: Can Federal Employment Discrimination Law and Em-
ployer Choice Provisions be Reconciled? 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507, 526 (1993) (citing
JAPAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 90 (Ronald E. Dolan & Robert L. Worden, eds., 5th ed. 1992). See
also Cary B. Samowitz, Title VII, United States Citizenship, and American National Ori-
gin, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 245 (1985).
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a debate among numerous legal scholars.17" Difficulty in resolving this
conflict partly stems from the historical fact that the Treaty was ratified
in 1953, before the enactment of Title VII. Title VII neither refers to the
FCN Treaty nor expressly indicates whether it encompasses foreign em-
ployers in the U.S. The existing U.S. civil rights laws fail to provide a
stable framework for reconciling two competing interests: promoting for-
eign investment by allowing investors certain hiring discretion, as op-
posed to adhering to America's uncompromising commitment to civil
rights.1 7 4 In other words, the U.S. legislation has yet to confront the chal-
lenge posed by globalization of the workforce.'75 In her recently published
book, Rochelle Kopp, Principal of Japan Intercultural Consulting, ex-
plains the ambiguity surrounding the applicability of U.S. discrimination
laws in the international arena:
Future cases will undoubtedly explore arcane legal issues raised
by the conflict between this international treaty and domestic civil
rights laws .... Clearly American (and international) law hasn't
caught up with the challenges posed by international personnel poli-
cies that extend across borders and affect employers of more than one
nationality.
17 6
2. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano
In Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano, 177 the Supreme Court
considered whether the Treaty privilege extended to the Sumitomo
America, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese trading company. Here
female secretarial employees brought a class action against Sumitomo
America, alleging sex and national origin discrimination. s7 8 They claimed
that the firm had reserved its upper-level managerial positions mainly for
Japanese men.' 7 9 The Second Circuit agreed to provide Sumitomo
America with the Treaty defense in hiring Japanese nationals for the key
173. Many articles have explored the availability of Article VIII(l) defense to Japanese
multinational firms. See supra note 26.
174. Mullen, supra note 6, at 780-82. See also Orebic, supra note 26, at 406 (concluding
that the resolution of the conflict between the Treaty provision and Title VII depends on a
balancing of the two policies).
175. Mullen, supra note 6, at 782 (suggesting one possible approach of negotiating bi-
lateral or multi-lateral Equal Employment Opportunity agreements).
176. Kopp, SUPRA note 18, at 243. See also Mullen, supra note 6, at 782 (concluding that
"American antidiscrimination law must be adapted to address the multidimensional nature
of the EEO charges involving foreign-owned corporations"); Rosner, supra note 26, at 894
(stating that "[t]he employment practices of Japanese subsidiaries present a case of first
impression in the employment discrimination field).
177. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176. Sumitomo is called sogo shysha in Japanese, meaning a
general trading company. Sogo shyosha represents one of the most typical forms of Japa-
nese multinational firms vigorously conducting overseas business activities. Lansing &
Palmer, supra note 26 (stating that these firms may distribute 20,000 individual items and
maintain resident offices in as many as 100 foreign nations).
178. Avigliano, 638 F.2d. 552.
179. Id. at 553.
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positions.1so The Supreme Court reversed the decision; 81 in its analysis,
the Court viewed Sumitomo America, a subsidiary incorporated under the
New York laws, as a U.S. company subject to Title VII. 82 It further dis-
tinguished a locally incorporated subsidiary from a branch of a foreign
corporation. However, the Court did not address whether an American
subsidiary may properly invoke the Treaty defense when the parent com-
pany dictates the subsidiary's alleged discriminatory conduct.
83
3. Fortino v. Quasar Co.
The Fortino"' case addressed the availability of the Treaty defense
to an American subsidiary of a Japanese firm, as opposed to a wholly
owned Japanese subsidiary incorporated in the U.S. as in the Sumitomo
case. This case arose over dismissal of three American managerial em-
ployees by Quasar, an un-incorporated division of Matsushita Electric
Corporation of America. Under Title VII, plaintiffs alleged discrimination
on basis of their non-Oriental origin.'85 In 1990, the U.S. District Court
rendered verdict for plaintiffs and awarded them 2.5 million dollars in
damages. In reversing this decision, the Seventh Circuit explored what it
viewed as the most essential question: whether the employer, an Ameri-
can subsidiary of a Japanese firm, may assert its parent's privilege under
the FCN Treaty as a Title VII defense. 8 6 The court expressly chose to
consider the applicability of the FCN Treaty although Quasar did not
raise the issue in the district court.' 8 The Seventh Circuit justified its
decision to do so "for the sake of international comity, amity, and com-
merce."' 8 8 It then held that the parent's Treaty-based immunity does
180. Id. at 558.
181. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182.
182. Id. at 182-83 (stating that "[b]oth the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the
United States Department of State agree that a United States corporation, even when
wholly owned by a Japanese company, is not a company of Japan under the Treaty and is
therefore not covered by Article VIII(I)"). Ronald Brown summarizes the ultimate result of
the Sumitomo case as follows:
Some five years later, a settlement in this case was announced where the em-
ployer agreed to allocate nearly $3 million over three years to train, promote,
and pay its female workers in the United States. The settlement agreement
also requires that women be placed in 23-25 percent of the management and
sales positions. The company attorney is quoted as saying there is no admis-
sion of liability and the agreement reflects a decision to 'Americanize' its U.S.
offices as part of a 'world-wide localization' of its subsidiaries.
Brown, supra note 152, at 250 (citing 10 D.L.R.(BNA) A-7, A-8 (Jan. 15, 1987)).
183. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189-90 n.19.
184. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
185. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 399.
186. FCN Treaty, supra note 168.
187. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391.
188. Plaintiffs requested the appellate court not to consider the treaty issue, because
the defendant had failed to raise it to the district judge. The Seventh Circuit rejected this
requested and explained as follows: "Ordinarily we will not consider a point that was not
raised in the district court, but we can do so, . . . and, for the sake of international comity,
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reach Fortino, and discrimination in favor of Japanese nationals by the
latter is not actionable.18 In so deciding, the court emphasized significant
control the parent had asserted over Fortino's business operations. 19
Some American scholars have criticized this decision as unfairly exempt-
ing Japanese multinational firms from Title VII liability.'
4. Lessons for Employers
Prudent Japanese employers should not rely on the FCN Treaty de-
fense for the following reasons. 19 First, since the Fortino decision was not
amity, and commerce, we should do so when we are asked to consider the bearing of a major
treaty with a major power and principal ally of the United States." Id.
189. In its amicus brief, the EEOC expressed its view that Quasar is a division of an
American corporation, and, therefore, they have no right to ignore U.S. discrimination laws.
Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 71.
190. In 1994, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas expressly
adopted the Fortino rationale in upholding the validity of the FCN Treaty defense asserted
by Uniden America (hereinafter "Uniden"), an American subsidiary of a Japanese corpora-
tion in an employment discrimination case. Uniden asserted that it had a right, under the
FCN Treaty, to discriminate against the American plaintiff on the basis of his race and
national origin. Papaila v. Uniden America Corp., 840 F.Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
Uniden is a subsidiary of Uniden Japan, a Japanese corporation headquartered in Tokyo
which manufactures and sells electronic equipment. Id. at 444. The court found the Fortino
reasoning persuasive and allowed Uniden to assert the Treaty right of its parent corporation
in Tokyo. Id. at 446.
191. See generally Donald D. Jackson, Titling the Playing Field: Japan's Unwar-
ranted Advantage under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Fortino v. Quasar Co., 28 TEx.
INT'L. L.J. 391 (1993); Steven J. Lewengrub, Seventh Circuit Allows American Subsidiary
to Avoid Title VII Liability by Asserting FCN Treaty Rights of Japanese Parent - Amer-
ican Employees Treated as Second Class Citizens - Court Cites Reciprocal Benefits for
American Firms Operating Abroad-Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991), 22
GA. J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 527 (1992); Wilson, supra note 172, at 535-542. Imura, then Chief
Executive Officer of Quasar, disagrees with the view that the Treaty provision gave the firm
an unfair advantage. Instead, he stresses that the source of ultimate victory was Quasar's
genuine attempt to resolve cross-cultural misunderstandings at trial. Imura points out, for
instance, that the firm successfully denied the trial court's finding that Quasar substantially
increased salaries of Japanese executives while discharging American executives. Plaintiffs'
allegation derived from Quasar's adjustment of a salary structure for its Japanese employees
in accordance with factors such as: "1) whether the employee lives in an apartment or owns
a home; 2) the size of the employee's family; and 3) whether the employee's children attend
public or private schools." At the appellate level, Quasar explained the general rule: foreign
subsidiaries of Japanese companies often pay housing and education allowances to meet the
needs of their expatriates. The company further proved that the American subsidiaries in
Japan as well, including IBM Japan, observe the same practice for their employees sent
from parent companies in the U.S. Likewise, Quasar asserted that it had discharged some
Japanese employees as well, contrary to the district court's finding. These explanations,
Imura says, helped resolve some misunderstanding. Also, Imura describes in detail how he
decided to appeal the case despite the corporate attorney's strong objection and how he
prepared for the appeal by carefully examining relevant documents and interviewing em-
ployees. This investigation convinced him that no discrimination had occurred. Kishi, supra
note 30, at 160.
192. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 7, at 478 (stating that ... it is nonetheless more
prudent for the Japanese employer to forego the protection of the Treaty, and make em-
1995
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
appealed,1 9 3 the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether an
American subsidiary may invoke the Treaty rights of its Japanese parent
company.1 94 Additionally, other courts may refuse to broadly construe the
parent's Treaty immunity. The EEOC has taken the position that it dis-
agrees with the Fortino holding: "because Quasar is a division of an
American corporation, . . . [the company should have] no right to ignore
[U.S.] discrimination laws.
1 95
Second, the Treaty exemption is restrictive in its scope; it applies
only to upper-level positions limited to "accountants, other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists."' 96
Third, even if the court does agree to grant the Treaty-based immu-
nity, companies may still incur substantial legal defense costs.197 Even at
the preliminary stage, where the discrimination claims are filed with the
EEOC or a state agency, the estimated defense costs already range from
five thousand to twenty thousand dollars.198 Entire proceedings may also
force companies to consume a large number of hours and to lose produc-
tive use of staff. 99 The administrative costs of implementing preventive
strategies may far outweigh the potential legal defense costs.2 0 0
Finally, any charges of discrimination, irrespective of their merits,
could impair the company's public image. 0 1 Given the fear of Japan's
economic power, allegations against Japanese investors may capture more
public attention.20 2 Thus, to minimize the risk of litigation, companies
should install comprehensive strategies in creating a working environ-
ment which stresses fairness and openness.
2 0 8
U.S. courts have articulated Title VII's goal as combating employ-
ment discrimination, which is "one of the most deplorable forms of dis-
crimination" in American society because "it deals not with just an indi-
ployment decisions on the unassailable criterion of employee qualifications").
193. Mullen, supra note 6, at 761 (citing Stephen G. Hirsch, Meet the New Boss, LEGAL
TIMES, May 11, 1992, at 25, 27 (special supplement: The Pacific Rim)).
194. The Supreme Court expressly stated: "[W]e also express no view as to whether
Sumitomo may assert any Article VIII(1) rights of its parent." Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189-90
n.19.
195. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 71.
196. FCN Treaty, supra note 168, at art. VIII(1).
197. Finegan, supra note 165, at 68.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., CALLAGHAN & COMPANY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION MANUAL, Pt.
II, §2.03 (1983).
201. Id. at 68.
202. See supra section III. A.
203. Finegan, supra note 165, at 71-72 (citing human-resources expert Marlene Porter,
who has successfully prevented her employer, the Community Bank of Homestead in
Miami, from being sued by its employees. During her twelve-year tenure, the Bank termi-
nated about 200 employees; yet, none has filed a suit). The article stresses the importance of
reducing the likelihood of potential litigation by introducing actual defensive policies
adopted by the Bank.
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vidual's sharing in the 'outer benefits' of being an American citizen, but
rather the ability to provide decently for one's family with a job or pro-
fession for which he qualifies or chooses."204 Japanese multinational firms
should honor moral and legal beliefs prevailing in their host nation. Their
failure to harmonize with U.S. culture confines Japanese investors into
their standing as foreign outsiders in the U.S. 0 5 Thus, they should make
sincere effort to integrate more local talent into the core labor force. The
expanded role of local employees will not only satisfy the firms' duty to
comply with the U.S. civil rights laws; it will also contribute to promoting
direct foreign investment.206 Additionally, by providing local communities
with more career opportunities, the company can create a positive im-
pression and gain social acceptance for its economic expansion.
B. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
1. Scope of the BFOQ Exemption
Title VII permits intentional discrimination on the basis of religion,
sex, or national origin when those practices are reasonably necessary for
the proper operation of the business. 07 In other words, defendants must
204. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Culpepper v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)). See also Rowe v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972); Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social
Services, 859 F.2d 1523, 1526-27 (7th Cir. 1986). One scholar describes the essential role of
work in both individual and social life as follows:
"The individual person is dignified by work; the community is enriched by
work. Society stands condemned by failure to provide meaningful work ...
work helps us become more fully human . . . Productive work will remain in-
comprehensible, or, at most, an ineffable and unattainable dream for the ma-
jority of the earth's population."
David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and The Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 119, 129-30 (1988).
205. Kopp, supra note 18, at 48.
206. One observer considers it "costly and politically risky" for multinational firms to
depend entirely on their home-country nationals. Kopp, supra note 18, at 49.
207. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-2(e). This section reads:
"[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise .... "
Id. The statutory BFOQ defense is distinguished from a judicially created "business
necessity" defense. A BFOQ is a defense to intentional discrimination ("disparate treat-
ment"). On the other hand, the business necessity defense is asserted in cases attacking
employment practices which are neutral on its face but adversely impact protected groups
under Title VII ("disparate impact"). Under this theory, discriminatory motive is unneces-
sary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To defend against a disparate impact
charge, the employer must prove that the practice in question "[bears] a demonstrable rela-
tionship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding against the use of testing and educational requirements,
which operated to disqualify black applicants at a substantially higher rate than white ap-
plicants). In essence, both the BFOQ and business necessity require that employers articu-
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provide a reasonable justification for their discriminatory conduct. To
satisfy that burden, employers must prove that " 'the essence' of [their]
business operation would be undermined" without challenged conduct.2 08
Also, they must prove a reasonable basis for their belief that "all or sub-
stantially all" members of the excluded class cannot perform the essential
job duties safely and efficiently s09 The BFOQ defense is asserted most
often in the context of gender discrimination.21 0
Traditionally, the BFOQ defense is construed narrowly. Dothard v.
Rawlinson2" exemplifies one of the rare circumstances where the defend-
ant survived the heightened judicial scrutiny typical in a BFOQ analysis.
The Supreme Court upheld the employer's refusal to hire women as cor-
rectional counselors in an all-male, maximum security prison. Being a
male qualified as a BFOQ, because the job required close physical prox-
imity to inmates, and the environment of violence and disorganization
would pose a serious risk of threat not only to women but also to other
guards and inmates."' 2 Other circumstances where the BFOQ defense
may prevail include "the preference of a French restaurant for a French
cook, the preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and
the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of members of
particular religious groups for a salesman to that religion ....
Notwithstanding the general rule, however, the Second Circuit has
agreed to expand the scope of the BFOQ analysis in cases involving Japa-
nese firms. "[A]s applied to a Japanese company enjoying rights under
Article VIII of the [FCN] Treaty, [the BFOQ] must be construed in a
manner that will give due weight to the Treaty rights. ... " 'To justify
national origin discrimination under this analysis, employers bear the
burden of showing the requirement of any of the following skills:
1. Japanese linguistic and cultural skills;
late a legitimate business purpose for challenged conduct. One scholar considers the BFOQ
defense more stringent than business necessity, which "encompasses considerations beyond
a narrow focus on job performance, such as workplace safety, societal concerns for environ-
mental protection ...." Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the
Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 5, 11 (1991)
(citing Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984) and Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982)). This article discusses the BFOQ de-
fense exclusively.
208. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
209. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
210. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991);
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc.,
447 F.Supp. 1346 (D.Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
211. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
212. Id. at 335.
213. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.Supp. 292, 297 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (citing
the Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII submitted by the Senate Floor Managers of
the Civil Rights Bill 1110 Cong. Rec. 7212 (1964)).
214. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559.
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2. knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business
practices;
3. familiarity with. . .the parent enterprise in Japan; and
4. acceptability to those with whom the company . . . does
business.2 "
Adames v. Mitusbishi Bank21 6 provides one example in which a Japa-
nese firm argued that understanding of the Japanese language and cul-
ture was reasonably necessary to their business practices. In this case,
which was summarized earlier, 17 the defendant claimedIa legitimate busi-
ness purpose for reserving most senior management positions for rotating
Japanese staff.2 8 The Bank's chief manager explained: "[K]nowledge of
Japanese business practices and management style . . . and the ability to
read, write, and speak the language, are all essential skills for many posi-
tions."2 19 Nevertheless, the manager later acknowledged his uncertainty
as to whether knowledge of Japanese business practices is an absolute
prerequisite to joining the rotating staff.220 Patricia Gaiton, former man-
ager responsible for personnel affairs, stated that the Bank had made lit-
tle effort, if any, to create promotional opportunities for local staff.22
Plaintiffs also claimed that the requirement of the Japanese language and
skills requirements operated as a pretext. For this argument, they ex-
plained that the Bank's services mainly involved providing primary lend-
ing for American-based and other non-Japanese corporations.22 They
then asserted that the nature of the business required familiarity with
U.S. banking practices and laws, rather than Japanese custom and lan-
guage.223 The court held that the Bank failed to articulate a legitimate
business reason for its allegedly discriminatory act.
224
2. Lessons for Employers
The Sumitomo court's expansion of the BFOQ analysis 228 should not
be read as an automatic assurance that Japanese firms may oversee the
substantive fairness of their job qualifications. Undoubtedly, courts will
refuse to give an unwarranted advantage to foreign companies which re-
quire linguistic or cultural skills as a pretext to exclude Americans. In
contrast to immutable characteristics, such as gender, knowledge of the
Japanese language and culture can be possessed or acquired by people of
215. Id.
216. This case arose over alleged discrimination based on race, descent, ancestry, and
ethnic characteristics. Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, 751 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
217. See supra section II. B.
218. Adames, 751 F.Supp. at 1553.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1553.
222. Id. at 1554.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1561.
225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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non-Japanese origin.2 26
Thus, to establish a legitimate justification, employers must articu-
late the validity of the qualifications through the use of concrete job de-
scriptions.2 7 For instance, certain positions may dictate that the job ap-
plicants possess a complete command of the language, because the
essential job duties involve intricate bilingual transactions. In preparing
job classifications, it remains insufficient for the employers to simply
throw in phrases such as "fluency in Japanese;" it can be read as merely
the perceived need for the language skill. Instead, the description should
specify the expected degree of proficiency. One example would be: "abil-
ity to speak Japanese sufficiently to conduct complex business negotia-
tions with native speakers." Likewise, if the position only requires basic
conversational skills, it may suffice to say: "at least two years of college-
level study with a minimum 3.0 grade-point average."
Equally important, employers should clarify the content of the job
duties which require the linguistic skills. For instance, what is the fre-
quency of communications between the American subsidiary and its Jap-
anese parent company? Are those communications done orally or in writ-
ing? Alternatively, does the job require serving Japanese clients, who do
not speak English?
Moreover, employers should provide a language program or tuition
reimbursement to help American employees acquire the requisite lan-
guage skills.22 8 Such effort will bolster the argument that the language
requirement derives from genuine business concerns.
2 29
While preparing job descriptions, companies should also delete any
subjective employment criteria such as loyalty and team spirit. In general,
Japanese employers place greater emphasis on employees' attitude,22 0
226. Abraham, supra note 7, at 506.
227. S. Prakash Sethi & Carl Swanson, Are Foreign Multinationals Violating U.S.
Civil Rights Laws? 4 EMP. REL. L.J. 485, 518-19 (1979).
228. MASATU No NAKA NO AMERICA SHINSHUTSU: NUHON KIGYo No RISUKu KANRI To
SHAKAI KOKEN [Official English title: TRANSCENDING TRADE FRICTIONS, JAPANESE-OWNED
BusINEssEs IN THE U.S., RISKS, SOCIAL CONTRMUTIONS], 66-67 (Tokyo Marine and Fire In-
surance Co., Ltd., ed. 1992) [hereinafter MASATU].
229. See Kopp, supra note 18, at 69. In a survey on over 400 large Japanese firms,
Professor Hideki Yoshihara of Kobe University noted that 81% of the respondents pointed
to personality (trustworthiness, etc.) as a desirable characteristic for locally hired managers
for international business operations. Id. at 76.
230. One researcher found a "good attitude" the most important quality Japanese man-
agers want in administrative or junior executive staff members. MARCH, supra note 41, at
120. See also TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 125-26 (noting the important role of attitude in
Japanese society). Yoshitaka Sajima, general manager of corporate planning for Mitui &
Company, suggested the essential role of interpersonal skills in Japanese corporations when
he commented that "[e]ven the top M.B.A. from Harvard or Stanford, a very capable, ag-
gressive person, might not be a good employee for us. He might destroy the harmony of our
system." Mullen, supra note 6, at 746-47 (citing Tamar Lewin, Sex Bias or Clash of Cul-
tures, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1982, at Dl, D6).
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rather than their concrete skills.2,3 Some of them may perceive that the
personal skills would qualify under the cultural skills in the BFOQ analy-
sis. However, because measurement of these "skills" dictates wholly sub-
jective value judgment, they will probably be subject to more rigid scru-
tiny than the language requirement. The court will not sustain arguments
which only reinforce common stereotypes: "Japanese nationals are more
likely to exhibit corporate loyalty than Americans" or "raised in society
based on collectivism, Japanese nationals can work better in a group than
Americans." Employers should set forth more objective criteria which ac-
curately reflect job-related skills.
Finally, the concept underlying the BFOQ defense can help Japanese
employers implement a merit system. As noted above, the BFOQ is an
affirmative defense, which employers assert against allegations of discrim-
ination. Nonetheless, at a preventive stage, employers can use a BFOQ
analysis effectively as a means of self-assessment; in hiring and promo-
tion, employers should critically evaluate the validity of their practices in
terms of whether they could qualify, if challenged, under the scope of the
BFOQ exemption. For that purpose, the two-step BFOQ analysis, which
was discussed earlier, will prove helpful. 282 This process should remind
employers to focus on job-related factors in their decision-making pro-
cess. It is a process of evaluating a job candidate on the basis of his or her
actual capabilities; the individual's gender or national origin, for instance,
should play no role unless such traits are necessary to fulfill the job du-
ties. Thus, the BFOQ analysis can serve as a foundation upon which Ja-
pan builds a merit system, one vital element of an egalitarian workplace.
231. Due to emphasis on personal skills rather than technical skills, the recruitment
and hiring process by Japanese firms tend to be highly subjective in nature. See Mullen,
supra note 6, at 750. Some critics have observed the same kind of subjective hiring among
Japanese employers overseas. An exercise in the "Access to Success" Overseas Manager Pro-
gram, run by the Management Services Center in Japan, made clear that Japanese manag-
ers prioritize superficial qualities in job interviews. In this exercise, videotaping of three
simulated interviews revealed that Japanese managers, as compared to American managers,
place less emphasis on candidates' abilities to perform the job, past work experience, or
motivation; instead, they are influenced by candidates' physical appearance or conversa-
tional skills. BYHAm, supra note 39, at 167. The subjective screening process also becomes
apparent as it pertains to the questions generally asked during job interviews. For example:
"Do you consider yourself a cooperative person;" "have you had any problems in interper-
sonal relationships;" "what do you think about dating;" "what do you usually talk about
with your friends;" "do you consider yourself organized?" KOBUNSHA, MENSETSU SHIKEN:
100-MON, 300-TO [JoB INTERVIEWS: 100 QUESTIONS AND 300 ANSWERS] (1994). Another book,
written specifically for female job seekers, contains a section entitled Typical interview
questions for women, including the following examples: "Do you have a boyfriend? If so, do
you plan to marry him;" "how often do you take the time to talk with your parents? Do you
get along better with your mother, or your father?" The book further explains that
recruiters' main concern is to evaluate candidates' personalities; particularly for non-mana-
gerial positions, recruiters tend to ask more subjective questions than those directly related
to work. JOSHI-GAKUSEI No TAME No SHUSHOKu BESTO RESSUN [JoB HUNTING INFORMATION
FOR FEMALE STUDENTS] 130-31 ((Norio Yoshida, ed., 1994).
232. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text for the two-step BFOQ analysis.
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V. MOVING TOWARD A MERIT SYSTEM
A. Japan's Economic Crisis and its Effect on Management
Pursuit of workforce equality will necessitate a fundamental change
at the core of Japanese corporate culture.2 83 In her article on Japan's
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Loraine Parkinson argues that full
attainment of equality in Japan would be impossible unless it results
from an institutional change - from a group to an individual orienta-
tion.234 Nevertheless, Parkinson cautions that "[d]ecades could pass
before the new structure is functioning at an efficiency level equivalent to
that of the old. '"3 5 Because of this, she adds, the economic loss in the
meantime would be great enough to hurt the Japanese economy.23 One
should note, however, that Parkinson's article was published in 1989,
before the economic crisis Japan is now facing. Contrary to Parkinson's
assertion, today's economic condition is more likely to compel employers
to adopt a new approach to management. Most importantly, they should
pursue hiring and promotion based on job-related qualifications of
individuals.2 '
Japanese-style management remained unchallenged, at least domesti-
cally, while Japan still prided itself as an economic superpower.23 The
people praised their own employment system as the source of the nation's
prosperity.2 9 Indeed, the postwar years observed a boost of the Gross Na-
tional Product per person by sixty times.24
Today, however, Japan is suffering the longest and severest economic
slump since World War II.1'1 Since February, 1993, the sharp rise of the
233. See, e.g., Loraine Parkinson, Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An
Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 604, 629 (1989) (noting that a
switch to the merit system is widely believed to be necessary for attainment of gender
equality in Japan).
234. Id. at 630.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Abraham, supra note 7, at 500-502 (discussing that this policy would allow Japa-
nese employers to retain those with necessary skills while avoiding the citizenship require-
ment as a pretexual reason for intentional discrimination).
238. "In the past, Japanese-style management was the corporate tool for survival. It
was at its finest when it pulled the country through the oil crises of the 1970s and the high-
yen slump of the late 1980s." Katayama, supra note 18, at 6.
239. Id. (noting that "no one saw the need to change a system that was clearly work-
ing" during the high growth period). See also Louise do Rosario, Out with the Oldies: Ja-
pan's Recession Takes Toll on "Lifetime" Employment, FAR EAST. EcON. REv., Apr. 22,
1993, at 74 (stating that Japanese white-collar workers had "little to complain about ...
before the current economic crisis.... they were rewarded with promotions and salaries for
their long working hours").
240. Before the war, Japan's Gross National Product was one-twentieth of its U.S.
counterpart. Today it exceeds the latter by 120%. Hato, supra note 18, at 33.
241. "The growth rate has repeatedly fallen short of the government's forecasts; con-
sumer spending, which accounts for 65% of gross national product, has been sluggish: and
capital spending, which accounts for another 20%, has also been slow." Takeuchi Yasuo,
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Japanese yen has gravely impaired the nation's export-oriented econ-
omy.""3 It has become apparent that Japan can no longer "stay drunk on
the wine of postwar success." s Public anxiety has mounted as to
whether the nation's economy can regain its vigor.
2 4 4
The collapse of the bubble economy has forced Japanese firms to
critically evaluate their employment system. As one observer described,
Japanese employers have "suddenly awoken to the fact that many aspects
of their time-honored personnel management methods .. .have become
handicaps rather than assets." 45 Recently, numerous observers have
stressed the need to reassess the value system at the core of traditional
labor practices. 246 They have argued that purely monetary strategies
alone remain insufficient to overcome the economic crisis.
In February, 1992, Sony chairperson Akio Morita cautioned that
"Japanese-style management [was] reaching the end of its usefulness.' ' 4 7
Jiro Ushio, chairperson of Ushio Inc., a manufacturer of industrial lamps
and optical electronic, predicts that individualism, low growth, and
globalization will destroy Japanese-style management within ten years. 4
On August 6, 1994, Asahi Shimbun, a major newspaper in Japan, re-
ported the following survey results on the Japanese labor practices:
among 354 companies, sixty-two percent agreed that lifetime employment
must be re-examined; ninety-seven percent said the same for the seniority
system.'
4 9
The Troubled Economy, 21 JAPAN ECHO 2 (1994).
242. Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 386. In January 1994, Eijiro Hats, Japan's minister
of international trade and industry, explained the adverse impact of the strong yen as fol-
lows: "[F]or each one yen increment of the Japanese yen against the dollar, Japan's auto
industry suffers a fifteen percent loss in pretax profits; electronics companies lose nearly
nine percent." Jathon Sapsford, Japan Inc.'s Earnings Slump Continues for the Fourth
Consecutive Fiscal Year, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at All. See generally Re-Engineering
the New U.S. Export to Japan, JAPAN-AM. DIG. 33 (May/June 1994). Osamu Katayama
notes Japan's inability to pull itself out of the recession as it did in the 1970s and 1980s by
"increasing productivity and quality to make its products more competitive internation-
ally." Katayama, supra note 18, at 11. Harumi Yamamoto express the similar view. For a
significant impact of Japan's weak economy on traditional Japanese-style management, see
Yamamoto, supra note 20 at 386.
243. Katayama, supra note 18, at 13.
244. Id. See also Inoki Takenori, Prescribing Medicine for a Global Recession, 21 JA-
PAN ECHO 6, 9 (1994).
245. "[L]ifetime employment, seniority-based promotion and compensation, and avoid-
ance of layoffs" exemplify these aspects. Kopp, supra note 18, at 224.
246. See supra note 18. See generally Yoichiro Hamabe, Inadvertent Support of
Traditional Employment Practices: Impediments to the Internationalization of Japanese
Employment Law, 12 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 306 (1994).
247. Katayama, supra note 18, at 4.
248. Id. at 13.
249. Minaosu-beki Nihon Koyo Shisutemu-wa [The Japanese Employment System
that Must Be Re-examined], ASAHI SHIMBUN [ASAHI NEWS], Aug. 6, 1994, at 10. 58% re-
sponded that lifetime employment may be maintained as long as it is modified to some
extent. As desirable modification, 88.3% intended to implement a hybrid system tailored to
accommodate both long-term and mobile employees. Id.
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In sum, international criticism does not serve as the sole motivating
factor for Japanese companies in adopting a new personnel policy. This
section explores changes in the current Japanese labor market and dem-
onstrates how creation of a merit system can provide the fuel of revital-
izing economy.250
B. Collapse of Lifetime Employment and Seniority System
Lifetime employment and seniority-based wages have long consti-
tuted the core of Japanese business management. Under the traditional
system, employers make hiring decisions based on personnel require-
ments rather than the need to fill a certain job or function.2 51 They hire
fresh graduates annually and retain them until mandatory retirement of
sixty. Using a broad array of motivational tools such as pep talks, boot
camps, calisthenics, and company slogans, employers take every step pos-
sible to instill values such as duty and group loyalty into their workers.
2 5 2
Seniority-based wage structures exemplify another motivational tool of
heightening a team spirit.25 s Firms determine salaries in accordance with
the length of employee's service so that they may eliminate a sense of
competition among workers.
25 4
Given the current state of economy, these time-honored practices are
losing their appeal.2 56 Excess labor,256 which includes loyal but incompe-
tent workers on the payroll, may cut into efficiently. 257 Companies tend to
view their mid-level managers as "overpaid, unproductive and nonessen-
tial.'' 258 As a result, more firms are now attempting to trim costs by im-
250. Sawa & Ishikura, supra note 18, at 69.
251. NIPPON STEEL HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, NIPPON: THE LAND AND ITS PEO-
PLE 137 (1988).
252. BYHAM, supra note 39, at 47 (1993); Lincoln, supra note 29, at 99.
253. By coupling permanent employment with seniority compensation, the seniority
system encourages loyalty and identification with the company's goals. Lincoln, supra note
29, at 93.
254. This established custom aims to eliminate a sense of competition among workers
and to foster corporate loyalty. Id.
255. One observer cautions, however, that most people are concerned only with tempo-
rary solutions to the current management deficiency; he stresses the importance of changing
the entire labor structure from a long-term perspective. HATO, supra note 18, at 61. Another
observer notes that it is too unrealistic to believe that lifetime employment will completely
disappear. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 202.
256. One expert estimates that Japan has at least 5 to 6 million redundant workers. He
also discusses cancellation of outstanding job offers by 114 firms to new university graduates
in the winter of 1992 to 1993. HORI, supra note 18, at 163.
257. Brown, supra note 152, at 239; Katayama, supra note 18, at 11-12; Sawa &
Ishikura, supra note 18. The traditional lifetime employment system would "act as an ame-
liorating counterforce" against unemployment: "If a company no longer needs workers for
some particular line of activity, it will always seek to train those displaced for some other
form of work in the company, and even when it faces an overall surplus of labor, it may seek
to keep workers occupied in make-work activities until natural attrition has eliminated the
surplus." REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 325.
258. Rosario, supra note 239.
JAPANESE COMPANIES
plementing early retirement. For the same reason, demotion and layoffs
have become more common. 259 Furthermore, some companies have
pushed redundant employees aside to a so-called window desk, "where
they practically are an outcast and do nothing."
2 6 0
Honda Motors adopted a policy of automatically discharging employ-
ees around age fifty-five.261 As of 1991, about forty percent of large Japa-
nese companies, especially financial or insurance firms, have adopted sim-
ilar policies.26 2 In August 1992, President Hiroshi Sato of TDK, the
world's largest manufacturer of magnetic tapes, directed fifty of his senior
managers to "stand by at home;" TDK agreed to pay ninety percent of
their salaries until retirement age as compensation for not working.2 68
Also, in January 1993, Pioneer Electric Corp., a leading manufacturer of
audio and video equipment, forced its thirty-five managers in their fifties
to choose either early retirement or dismissal.2 64 Capturing national at-
tention, the news profoundly disturbed the public mind.
2 65
A Ministry of Labor survey indicates the age applicable for early re-
tirement plans as follows: 49 or younger (20.9 percent); early fifties (40.3
percent); late fifties (28.7 percent).26 The survey goes on to suggest that
companies with 5,000 or more employees tend to target younger employ-
ees: 49 or younger (30.5 percent); early fifties (47.5 percent); late fifties
(21.2 percent).2 7 In July, 1993, journalist Osamu Katayama reported the
following statistical survey by Nikko Research Center: the current reces-
sion has subjected 1.1 million workers to "in-house unemployment," as
described above.268 This created dismay among middle-managers who
259. NEC Corp., for instance, chose to maintain its redundant human resources by re-
vising the job descriptions of some 1,300 of its 6,000 managers and rotating them from su-
pervisory positions to so-called in-house specialists working with subordinates. Yamamoto,
supra note 20, at 384; Is Future Bleak for Middle Managers?, JAPAN-AM. DIG. 31 (May/June
1994) [hereinafter Is Future Bleak]. See also Hamada, supra note 7, at 135 & 141 (discuss-
ing a gap between a myth and reality: for many, lifetime employment is "more of a dream
than a reasonable expectation" for many Japanese today); HoRI, supra note 18, at 163 (ob-
serving a steady increase of layoffs since 1992 and estimating that the unemployment rate
will rise to over 10% from the current level of under 2.5%).
260. Is Future Bleak, supra note 259. See also Uchihashi, supra note 27, at 47 (ex-
plaining how Japanese companies in general have coped with the current economic slump
by "thinning out the ranks of middle management, whether by outright dismissals or, more
frequently, by such indirect methods as demoting employees, pressuring them to take early
retirement, or making life unbearable for them in the workplace").
261. Is Future Bleak, supra note 259.
262. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 55-56.
263. HOrn, supra note 18, at 157.
264. Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 382; HoRI, supra note 18, at 163-64 (also discussing
examples of voluntary retirement programs implemented by two companies: Yamaha and
ALPS Electric).
265. Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 382.
266. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 55-56.
267. Id.
268. Katayama, supra note 18, at 12.
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have devoted their lives to the companies.269 In the emerging skill-based
work environment,27 0 the majority of middle mangers, who are generalists
rather than specialists, inevitably face the toughest challenge.
2 1
An organization of Japanese labor lawyers protested serious human
rights violations facing discharged or demoted employees.272 In February,
1993, the organization launched a two-day "employment restructuring
hotline" in three cities.272 The attorneys consulted employees who needed
legal advice regarding layoffs, demotion, internal transfers, early retire-
ment, and various other tactics the companies had adopted to cope with
the recession. For two days, the telephone kept ringing non-stop. The
lawyers accepted a total of 502 cases but predicted that twice as many
people had actually called in. Many calls came from managerial employ-
ees in their forties and fifties; the majority of them worked for large
corporations.
One case involved alleged practice by a fifty-one year-old manager of
a large musical instrument manufacturer; the company forced him to re-
tire after having him spend seven months in a dark basement room with
no work assignment.7 4 In another case, a forty-four year-old manager of a
computer software company was transferred to a subsidiary in the coun-
tryside. 26 This subsidiary was designed for employees whom the com-
pany expected to retire soon. Once transferred, he and other managerial
employees were taken to a forest, where they were assigned the task of
cutting trees, totally unrelated to the companies' software business. They
were forced to retire after much humiliation. This company forced more
than 3,000 employees to retire in several months.
In April, 1993, the lawyers' organization made a special request to
the Ministry of Labor to enforce fair treatment of senior employees. 276
Disgruntled middle managers have launched the Tokyo Managers' Union
269. Is Future Bleak, supra note 259, at 31. Kunio Miyazato, Koyo Chyosei Hottolaine
Kara [From the Employment Restructuring Hotline], No. 1308 RODo HORITSU JYUNPO [LA-
BOR LAW NEWS] 4 (1993) [hereinafter Restructuring Hotline].
270. For a discussion of the growing need for employees with technical skills or knowl-
edge, see infra V. D.
271. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 145. See also Rosario, supra note 239, at 74
(explaining that companies tend to view mid-level managers as "overpaid, unproductive and
nonessential").
272. Many employers have justified their unreasonable treatment of workers as a strat-
egy to cope with the recession. They have often ignored their duty imposed by the Labor
Standards Law. The Labor Standards Law provides general guidelines regarding labor con-
tracts, wages, work hours, etc. Rodo Kijun Ho [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 (1947).
One critic describes this situation by using the expression: "[Japanese] labor law stands still
at the entrance gate." Restructuing Hotline, supra note 269, at 4-5.
273. Id.; Is Future Bleak, supra note 259, at 31.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Nihon Rodo Bengodan [Japan Labor Law Attorneys Association], Koyo Chyosei ni
Kansuru Yobosyo [Prevention of Employment Restructuring], No. 1310, RODO HORITSU JY-
UNPO [LABOR LAW NEWS] 21-23 (1993).
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(TMU). 7 7 TMU's request to the Ministry of Labor to be acknowledged as
a legitimate labor union has been jeopardized; employers have tried hard
to "stop the movement before it becomes a menace. "278
As well as lifetime employment, the seniority system is gradually dis-
appearing; more companies are now willing to pay individually negotiated
salaries. 27 9 As noted above, Japanese firms originally valued the seniority
system as an effective way to eliminate a sense of competition among
workers and to heighten company loyalty.28 0 This custom, long advocated
by labor unions, is now giving way to the merit system.2 " As of spring,
1993, 10.4 percent of the surveyed employers have implemented the new
salary structure based on individual salary negotiation; thirty percent in-
tended to adopt it in the future.2 8 ' A well-publicized policy launched by
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. in 1992 allows managerial employees to negotiate
annual salary with the company based on the individual's qualifications
and performance.2 83 In 1993, Fujitsu Ltd. adopted a similar arrange-
ment.2 84 Honda and Fujitsu are considered the first to adopt the practice
of individually negotiated salaries throughout the managerial hierarchy.28
C. Increase in Job Mobility
The gradual decline of lifetime employment derives from changing
labor consciousness as well. The increase in job mobility reflects the rise
of individualism among younger generations in Japan.2 8 A survey result
277. Is Future Bleak, supra note 259, at 31.
278. Id.
279. See generally Rodo-Sho [Ministry of Labor], Rodo Hakusho Hakusho [White Pa-
per on Labor] 246-52 (1994); Katayama, supra note 18, at 12. According to a study at the
Institute of Business Research at Daito Bunka University in Japan, the majority of the
personnel managers from the surveyed companies agreed that the seniority system needs
gradual but substantial modifications. Mroczkowki & Hanaoka, supra note 20, at 280.
280. JAPAN TRAVEL BUREAU, SALARYMAN IN JAPAN 42-43 (1986).
281. Id.
282. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 107.
283. Id. at 106-107; HORI, supra note 18, at 164 (noting that Honda's program initially
included about 4,500 middle managers, nearly 15% of its total workforce).
284. Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 386.
285. In the past, only a small number of employers, such as Sony Corp., some depart-
ment stores, and general merchandisers, based annual compensation on systems other than
solely on the length of service. Nonetheless, Honda and Fujitsu are "the first to apply the
practice of American-style individual salary negotiation systematically throughout the man-
agerial hierarchy." Id. Shintaro Hori introduces some other examples of recent personnel
actions by major Japanese firms: (1) Japan Air Lines plans to reduce its staff through volun-
tary retirement, hiring freezes, and one-year paid-absence programs; (2) IBM Japan initi-
ated a voluntary-retirement program for employees over the age 50 by offering a 50% in-
crease in the lump sum received at retirement (average, approximately 15 million yen on
average) and outplacement until age 65 at one of IBM's affiliated companies; (3) Mitui Min-
ing and Smelting plans to eliminate 300 employees (6% of its total work force) through
transfers to affiliated companies and cut management salaries by an undisclosed amount.
HORI, supra note 18, at 167 (1993).
286. See HORI, supra note 18, at 39-42 (noting that senior managers should learn the
value of individualism from their subordinates). See also Lincoln, supra note 29, at 89.
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affirms their tendency to share "American-style values of leisure, con-
sumption, and affluence. ' 8 7 Consequently, younger people tend to per-
ceive work as a means of self-expression. 8 Their primary goal is to real-
ize their individual potential, not to devote their life to one company. 8e
This shift in labor consciousness emerged around 1984, when the Gross
National Product per person exceeded 10,000 dollars. No longer viewed as
an act of betrayal, switching jobs has gained greater social acceptance. 90
A Ministry of Labor survey reveals a substantial increase in the num-
ber of people who have switched jobs during the last several years: in
1985, 2,245,000 workers have changed their jobs, whereas 3,248,000 work-
ers have done so in 1991.291 As of 1993, 22.2 percent of university gradu-
ates and 44.2 percent of high school graduates have switched jobs. 92 Job
mobility has increased particularly in large corporations, where lifetime
employment was once the norm.2 93
In another notable development, employers as well have changed
their attitude toward lifetime employment. In 1991, only thirty percent of
the surveyed companies intended to hire mainly from among new gradu-
ates; twenty percent to hire from among those with previous work experi-
ence; and fifty percent to hire from a mixed pool.2 9' In five years since
1985, Sumitomo Trust Bank has hired 159 persons with a wide array of
previous work experience, such as finance (thirty-six persons), manufac-
turing (thirty persons), construction/real estate (thirty persons), software
computers (twenty-two persons), trade (nine persons), and the mass me-
dia (six persons) .295 This diversity in backgrounds is noteworthy, in light
of the conservative attitudes prevailing among Japanese banks. 9 6 The
greater emphasis on personal autonomy will increase the need to create a
flexible work environment.
D. Demand for Professionals
Japanese firms have long valued generalists who live up to the essen-
tial part of their managerial philosophy: to develop flexibility by ac-
287. Lincoln, supra note 29, at 93.
288. HATO, supra note 18, at 46-48.
289. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 326 (discussing less loyalty and commitment among
younger workers, who reject the paternalistic nature of traditional management and "crave
more freedom in their personal lives"). Not only young people but also senior-level employ-
ees are now more interested in switching jobs in order to maximize their potential. Among
the managers and professionals surveyed by Nippon Manpower, a Japanese human resource
development company, 75% of the respondents declared their interest in entertaining a lu-
crative offer from a headhunter. Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, supra note 20, at 284.
290. Changing Jobs Becoming More Popular, 36 JAPAN REPT. 5 (1990).
291. KAWARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 55-56.
292. Id. at 55-75.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 55-69.




cepting a wide range of tasks in order to understand various aspects of
the organization.2 9 Nonetheless, current trends in Japanese management
clearly suggest employers' need to seek individuals with concrete skills.""9
In general, the growth of service and high-tech industries has significantly
increased the need for trained professionals, while rendering company-
specific, wide-ranging skills less useful.299 Japanese firms are now facing
the challenge of shifting their focus on manufacturing to more creative
activities, including planning, design, and development of products. °0
In the course of postwar economic development, Japan simply aimed
at overcoming poverty by relying on its manufacturing industries.8 0' In
those days, diligence of blue-collar workers, measured by long hours
worked, served as the core of Japanese economy. Today, however, more
emphasis is placed on so-called process management, "the process of deci-
sion-making and product-development itself."30' 2 In this context, sole reli-
ance on workers whose only virtues are diligence or loyalty can hamper
the corporate development.
3 0 3
Critics have asserted that the weakness of Japanese service-sector
jobs partly stems from disrespect of individuality.3 0' Japan's traditional
labor pool composed of its homogeneous population 0 may only suppress
297. Coral Snodgrass, who studied many Japanese corporations, assert that this indi-
vidual flexibility arises "because the Japanese organization itself is so inflexible." BYHAM,
supra note 39, at 14 (citing Coral Snodgrass and J. Grant, Cultural Influences on Strategic
Planning and Control Systems, 4 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MGMT. 205-28 (1986)). See also
NAKATANI, supra note 18, at 4 (observing that many specialists, who had failed to exhibit
sufficient flexibility to perform a wide variety of tasks, were forced to leave companies).
298. HORI, supra note 18, at 205-207.
299. HAM.AA, supra note 156 at 58; HORI, supra note 18, at 100; NAKATANI, supra note
18, at 87-91 and 216-22.
300. Among companies surveyed by the Ministry of Labor in 1992, 52.9% responded
that they expected an increase of positions requiring high-level technical knowledge or
skills. Rodo-Sho [Ministry of Labor], Rodo Hakusho [White Paper on Labor] 155-56, 192-
201 (1993). Shintaro Hori, who has consulted to numerous Japanese firms on business strat-
egies, explains that Japanese corporations must reconsider their functional priorities: "[Jap-
anese companies] must focus on improving the productivity and innovativeness of white-
collar workers with the same level of commitment and vigor they directed at becoming
highly productive quality and customer-oriented manufacturers." HORI, supra note 18, at
158. See also Ushio Jiro & Noguchi Yukio, Reforming Japan's "War-Footing" Economic
System, 21 JAPAN ECHO 13, 18 (1994) (explaining the need to "shift from a production-
oriented to a consumption-oriented economy").
301. See Katayama, supra note 18, at 13. For a discussion of Japan's postwar economic
development, see generally REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 309-19.
302. Katayama, supra note 18, at 13. See also Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 386 (fore-
seeing companies' need to rely more heavily on "creative activities, such as planning, design,
and development to survive").
303. Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 386.
304. Sawa & Ishikura, supra note 18. Japanese firms, while emphasizing individuals as
components of a team, pay little attention to specialized skills. WILLIAM OUCHi, THEORY Z 76
(1981) (discussing a lower degree of professionalism in Japanese corporations).
305. See Kopp, supra note 18, at 223-24 (explaining that Japanese traditional manage-
ment, which encourages passivity, conformity, and conservatism, can no longer help the na-
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creativity needed to boost the business. 06 Therefore, companies should
strive to build a workforce composed of diverse values and skills, 07 which
challenges talented employees to contribute innovative ideas.808 The se-
niority system, which creates a "false equality that overemphasizes har-
mony," is less likely to motivate employees to maximize their individual
potential.'0 9
Other trends as well bolster the argument for the merit system. The
rising number of temporary and contract employees suggests a greater
demand for professionals for immediate use. 10 The number of temporary
workers has increased by about 4.5 times, from 145,000 in 1986 to 654,000
in 1992.311 Similarly, contract employees have increased from 7.9% in
1987 to 18.9 percent in 1993.818 Also, more firms are beginning to use
Western-style headhunters to fill their managerial and technical staff. s
In January, 1994, Toyota Motor Corp. announced its plan to hire automo-
bile designers under one-year contracts and with merit-based annual sala-
ries.3"' Explaining its decision to turn away from lifetime employment,
Toyota' statement read: "[a]s the business conditions surrounding Japa-
nese corporations underwent radical change, however, it was inevitable
that the rigid organizational structure of the past would impose limits on
corporate growth." ' As the Wall Street Journal reported, this decision
by Toyota, one of the most conservative firms in Japan, will profoundly
affect on Japanese labor practices."' Major corporations are now opting
for midcareer recruitment, which enables them to hire talented employees
for narrowly defined roles.
3 1 7
tion's economy as Japanese business shifts its focus from "cost leadership to innovation and
high value-added products").
306. Sawa & Ishikura, supra note 18.
307. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 386; HorI, supra note 18, at 42-43 & 211-
12; Sawa & Ishikura, supra note 18, at 69 (noting that individuals, as well as corporations,
should change their attitude toward jobs; in choosing jobs, they should focus more on what
they truly want to do).
308. Katayama, supra note 18, at 13.
309. Id.
310. KAWARu NIHON, supra note 18, at 55-69. Mroczkowski and Hanaoka introduce
some examples of new hiring practices among Japanese firms. Nikko Securities, for instance,
hire foreign exchange traders at high salaries on a contract basis. The career path for these
contract employees is entirely separate from the traditional lifetime employment track; their
salaries and career prospects are based on their performance. Mroczkowski & Hanaoka,
supra note 20, at 283-84.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Mroczkowski & Hanaoka, supra note 20, at 286; HATO, supra note 18, at 58.
314. Michael Williams, Toyota Creates Work Contracts Challenging Lifetime-Job Sys-
tem, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1994, at A8.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. HATO, supra note 18, at 133-34. Sumitomo Gomu Kogyo Company's "job request
system," which was adopted in 1990, exemplifies such a trend: the firm allows its newly
hired employees, after three months of orientational training, to select three sections they
hope to work for. The rate of a person being assigned to the position of his or her first
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E. Anticipation of Labor Shortages
The rapidly aging population of Japan, coupled with a declining
birth rate, will also profoundly affect the nation's labor market81s Pres-
ently, the Japanese population's aging rate is highest in the world. 19 In
1992, the Ministry of Labor reported that people over the age of sixty-five
accounted for 12.6 percent of the entire population.8 2 0 Among this group,
the number of people over the age of seventy-five has sharply in-
creased.3 21 Furthermore, the Ministry of Welfare estimates that the num-
ber of the elderly will reach 6,000,0008s 2 by the year 2,000." This means
that Japan will have the highest percentage of the elderly in the world. 2 '
Furthermore, according to the Institute of Population Problems, Japan's
birth rate, which was 1.57 children per woman in 1989, is expected to
decrease to 1.32 children per woman by 1996.3
2 5
The shrinking labor force will necessitate the greater use of older,
experienced workers as additional labor resources. 2 Older workers them-
selves are hoping to remain in the workforce longer, as shown in the fol-
lowing survey by the Prime Minister's Office. Among the surveyed work-
ers, 23.2 percent and 57.1 percent expressed their desire to work until age
sixty and sixty-five respectively.2 7 Among males in their fifties, nearing
their mandatory retirement age of sixty, as high as 68.8 percent hoped to
work until age sixty-five. This figure rose to 91.2 percent among males
between age sixty and sixty-four.
Currently, some employers may see demotion and layoffs, which au-
tomatically eliminate older workers, as an inevitable strategy to cope with
the economic crisis. However, one major advantage of hiring older em-
ployees lies in cutting down costs on training young and inexperienced
choice amounts to 80%. The rate equals 100% if the persons assigned to the positions of
their third choice are included. This type of personnel policy is still considered extremely
rare in Japan. Id. Hato discusses other examples of "revolutionary hiring" recently adopted
by some major companies including Sony and Japan Air Lines. Id. at 128-34.
318. The Japanese population is aging at the world's highest rate. Rodo-Sho [Ministry
of Labor], Fujin Rodo Hakushyo [White Paper on Women's Labor] 40 (1992). In June 1990,
the Ministry of Labor raised the minimum retirement age for 55 to 60. After the age of 60,
employers may rehire workers on a commissioned basis. Akwi Seo, Work Keeps Them
Healthy, 37 LOOK JAPAN (1991).
319. Fujin Rodo Hakushyo, supra note 318, at 40.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 41.
322. Japan has a population of 120.75 million.
323. Fujin Rodo Hakushyo, supra note 318, at 41.
324. Sodei Takao, Family in an Age of Working Women, 9 JAPAN ECHO 95, 102 (1982)
(concluding that women's role in the labor force should increase in the aging society).
325. Japan Information Center, Experts Think Japan's Low Birthrate Could Decline
Further, 37 JAPAN REP. 2 (1991).
326. See Uchihashi, supra note 23, at 49 (stating Japan's need to pass a law against age
discrimination, because "it is wrong to deny [elderly workers] their seniority rights on the
grounds that their present abilities are unequal to their past contribution").
327. KAwARU NIHON, supra note 18, at 211-12.
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workers.32' From a long-term perspective, the Japanese employment sys-
tem should be restructured to meet the needs of the anticipated labor
shortage.
VI. PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION CHARGES
The rise of employment disputes involving Japanese firms in the U.S.
should alert the employers to formulate human resource policies as a vital
part of global management. 29 This section offers suggestions on what
steps companies should take in order to avoid conflict. 30
First, the Japanese firm should retain a lawyer capable of offering
practical legal advice based on his or her solid understanding of the U.S.
and Japan cultures and business practices.33 1 Legal knowledge alone will
remain inadequate to deal with possible clash of two fundamentally dif-
ferent cultures.3 2 The attorney should assist the company in implement-
ing various strategies to minimize the risk of litigation. For instance, he
or she should be able to help prepare written documents on various as-
pects of employment such as work regulations, fringe benefits, and sexual
harassment policies.3 3
Second, the attorney should provide an educational program to ac-
quaint Japanese managers with U.S. antidiscrimination laws. This pro-
gram should cover both theoretical aspects of the laws and case studies
based on suits against Japanese or other multinational firms in the U.S.
In addition, interviewing skills workshops can help recruiters learn what
constitute impermissible questions at job interviews.3 3 4 Managers rotating
from Japan should be required to undergo such training prior to depar-
ture. The company should create methods to evaluate their level of un-
derstanding after participation.33 5 This helps ensure that the managers
arrive in the U.S., truly informed. Likewise, the employer should offer
seminars for both Japanese and American employees, designed to en-
hance their cross-cultural understanding and to develop interpersonal
328. Id. at 166.
329. One observer emphasizes human resources management as playing the most criti-
cal role in the success of a Japanese corporation. Japanese businesses heavily relied on pro-
duction in the 1960s and 70s and on marketing in 1980s. Japanese economy today, however,
should shift its focus from goods to people. HATO, supra note 18, at 110-14.
330. See generally MARY GREENWOOD, HIRING, SUPERVISING AND FIRING EMPLOYEES: AN
EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1987); PITFALLS, supra note 8.
331. PITFALLS, supra note 8, at 6-7.
332. Schaifer, supra note 26, at 399 (suggesting the appropriate role for American at-
torneys advising Japanese multinational corporations).
333. PITFALLS, supra note 8, at 6-7.
334. Finegan, supra note 165, at 69.
335. Equally important, the company should carefully evaluate candidates for overseas
assignment in terms of their fluency in English, cross-cultural experience, communication
skills, the ability to work through conflicts, and so on. The company should also consider




skills in the multinational workplace.8 86 Such training can build itself on
interactive sessions, which include activities such as role plays, exercises,
and group discussions."8 ' Nonetheless, gaining intercultural understand-
ing has to be a long, ongoing process. 88 Thus, the company should en-
courage their employees to work through conflicts and misunderstanding,
bridging cultural gaps through learning-by-doing.8 9 On a more informal
basis, the company should sponsor social activities encouraging participa-
tion from all workers. To cultivate harmonious work relations based on
trust, it is vital to make Americans feel part of the company.840
Third, the company should provide a well-defined job description for
each position. " The description should be both accurate and detailed,
including job duties, requisite skills, knowledge, education, and experi-
ence. Publishing such information enables the company to articulate ob-
jective standards in hiring and promotion. At the same time, it gives the
employer the opportunity to evaluate its own employment criteria.
Fourth, supervisors should be required to document all important ac-
tions. Written records can be of great value in case any dispute arises. For
newly hired employees, the company should provide a handbook on per-
sonnel policies, including a list of conduct that may lead to termina-
tion. 42 Equally important, the company should adopt a procedure to re-
view and update documents systematically. This gives the employer the
opportunity to assure that the corporate policies are proper in light of
336. More than one-third of the 578 companies surveyed by the Olsten Corporation
reported the increasing need for employees with multicultural communication skills. Robert
Hayles, Vice President of Cultural Diversity for Grand Metropolitan Food Sector, explained
that companies must get an "everyday understanding of whom diversity involves, what di-
versity is, and why diversity is necessary." WARREN GORHAM LAMONT, WHAT You NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT MANAGING DIVERSITY 10 (1992). Shelly Lieberman, Multicultural and Cross-
Cultural Consultant and Director of Educational Outreach and Marketing, discusses poten-
tial benefits from a diversity training program, intended to nurture sensitivity and under-
standing of cultural differences: (1) growth in previously unexplored marketplaces; (2) rede-
velopment of markets that were not sensitively managed due to a lack of understanding of
communities served; (3) improved employee relations; (4) wider range of problem-solving
skills; (5) better allocation and utilization of human resources; (6) better vendor relation-
ship; and (7) increased productivity. Id. at 26.
337. Id. at 34-36.
338. Id. at 31.
339. See, e.g., Kopp, supra note 18, at 25 (stating that "[simall matters frequently esca-
late into major misunderstandings that pit Japanese and locally hired employees against
each other").
340. As one way to achieving this goal, the company as a whole should actively partici-
pate in the local community affairs through philanthropic activities. This tactic will also
help enhance the corporate image in the community. MASATU, supra note 228 (emphasizing
the importance of social contributions by corporations and introducing examples from vari-
ous multinational corporations).
341. Typically, Japanese companies prepare job descriptions for department managers,
but not for individual employees. Id. at 75-77. See also HorI, supra note 18, at 184
(stressing the need for clarification of individual responsibility).
342. Finegan, supra note 165, at 70.
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furthering the goal of equal employment opportunity.8 3
Fifth, the company should make every effort to facilitate effective
communication between management and employees. For instance, Japa-
nese supervisors should straightforwardly communicate to the employees
the result of performance appraisals.8 4 ' Avoidance of open confrontation
constitutes a common element of Japanese culture. Bosses often remain
reluctant to inform their subordinates, in a direct and forthright way, of
any problems that need to be corrected. To preserve congenial working
relationships, they may use inference 4" or give their feedback informally
by "[surrounding] employees in an atmosphere of daily advice and admo-
nitions.' '3 "s Lack of direct communication may, however, cause some mis-
understanding on the part of American employees.4 7 Therefore, the com-
pany should also create opportunities to receive employees' comments on
work conditions. Such opportunities may take various forms ranging from
individual conferences to opinion surveys.
Sixth, all forms of internal communications should be carried out in
English, when possible. This rule should apply to written materials, such
as personnel policies, company memos, and notices on the bulletin board.
Documents in Japanese, even if accompanied by English translations,
may cause mistrust among American employees. 4 8 For the same reason,
all company meetings should be conducted in English. Akihiko
Maruyama, who was in charge of human resources management at Tokyo
Marine and Fire Insurance Company in New York, stresses this point
from his own experiences and observations. 49 Maruyama explains that
some Americans feel being excluded from decision-making when Japanese
managers speak Japanese to each other, even in informal discussions.3 0
343. PITFALLS, supra note 8, at 32-35.
344. HORI, supra note 18, at 187-88. The company should also articulate the method
and standards of evaluation.
345. To avoid sharp conflict of views, the Japanese often rely on nonverbal communica-
tion. REISCHAUER, supra note 7, at 136.
346. BYHAM, supra note 39, at 12.
347. Also, at the job interview, Japanese employers should refrain from making com-
ments out of courtesy such as, "We hope you will be able to stay with us as long as possi-
ble." Such an ambiguous statement may create a false impression that the company guaran-
tees lifetime employment. KIsHI, supra note 30. In Fitzgibbon v. Sanyo Securities
America,Inc., a discharged American employee asserted his receipt of the Japanese em-
ployer's oral and written assurances of lifetime employment. For instance, plaintiff submit-
ted a handwritten statement on a loan application that "employment will be a sort of life-
time employment." The court rejected this argument, because a reasonable person would
not recognize this statement as an express limitation upon the employer's right to terminate
at will. Fitzgibbon v. Sanyo Securities America, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 2818 (RPP), 1994 WL
281928, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1994).
348. Finegan, supra note 165.
349. KISHI, supra note 30, at 184-85.
350. Id. The following discrimination suit against a Japanese company provides one
example. In this case, an American plaintiff claimed, among other things, that his employer
had sponsored recreational activities exclusively for its Japanese employees. The court
found that the company, in fact, provided the activities for all employees. Partly because he
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Seventh, the company should establish an internal procedure, which
responds to complaints, conducts a thorough investigation to determine
whether any discrimination has occurred, and if it has, to take corrective
action."5 ' The officers involved in this process should consist of both Jap-
anese and Americans.
Finally, the company should carefully evaluate the racial and ethnic
composition of its work force, ensuring adequate representation of the lo-
cal population. The amount of autonomy given to local staff can largely
determine the degree of the firm's globalization. 5 ' From a more practical
viewpoint, heavy reliance on expatriates deprives Japanese companies of
the opportunity to use valuable human resources; aided by their knowl-
edge of the local conditions, American managers can greatly enhance bus-
iness operations."' 3
VII. CREATION OF A THIRD-CULTURE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
To fulfill their duty to comply with the U.S. civil rights laws, Japa-
nese firms must curtail various aspects of their traditional employment
practices. Nonetheless, this curtailment does not mean that the compa-
nies must replace their entire management structure with its U.S. coun-
terpart. Americans may, in fact, find certain aspects of Japanese-style
management admirable. 5 4
Ronald A. Morse, Executive Vice President of the Economic Strategy
Institute, discusses underlying values supporting Japan's economic per-
formance, such as loyalty and teamwork; he then concludes that there is
no reason to condemn these values as long as they do not manifest them-
selves in unfair employment practices. 355 Professor Brown at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii School of Law points out that joint employer-employee
consultation committees, flexible job descriptions, and attempts at coop-
eration rather than conflict to resolve disputes find greater use in the
American workplace.15  He further introduces an effort by the G.M-
had seen a sign advertising excursion trips in Japanese, the plaintiff assumed that the com-
pany had excluded him. Walsh v. Eagle Wings Industries, Inc., No.89-2052, 1991 WL 90906
(C.D.Ill. 1991), at *3.
351. EQ. EMPL. COMPL. MAN., Pt.II section 2.03-2.09 (1983).
352. Mroczkowski & Linowes, supra note 12, at 28.
353. BYHAM, supra note 39, at 214.
354. Brown, supra note 152, at 239-40.
355. Lantos Hearings, supra note 30, at 180-81 (observing that "the Japanese educa-
tional system and the corporate training programs prepare an excellent and effective
workforce for Japanese business").
356. Brown, supra note 152, at 239-40. Some U.S. manufacturers of Japanese origin
have successfully adopted certain aspects of Japanese-style management. For instance, Ky-
ocera in San Diego has implemented a "Honor Employee System", which offers privileges to
employees who have reported to work on time and have not been absent for six months in a
row. Other examples include: "the self-disciplined, small, autonomous group method; 30-
minute morning communication meetings; pep talks; bottom-up suggestion system meetings,
and group competition bonus systems." KOBAYASHI, supra note 43, at 94-95. Based on a
comparative survey, James Lincoln discusses what specific aspects of Japanese-style man-
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Toyota joint venture in California, and the G.M. Saturn project, as well
as numerous projects in the steel and manufacturing industries to learn
from Japan's success; they have "taken great strides in devising manage-
ment and labor relations approaches and contract provisions which seek
to replace confrontation with cooperation."
3 5 7
In his book on Japanese management, Theory Z, William Ouchi
questions a potentially destructive aspect of excessive individualism at
the core of competitive American workplaces.358 Predominance of self-as-
sertion over group conformity creates a society where "each person is at
war with the other."359 Characterized by a high degree of specialization,
American-style management tends to promote a hierarchical culture; pro-
fessionals are glorified while those without high-level skills remain unap-
preciated. In contrast, Japanese companies have used a variety of meth-
ods of building team .spirit by eliminating a sense of competition among
all workers.36 0 Ouchi compares individualism asserted by Americans with
collectivism emphasized by the Japanese. 6 1 He then advocates the latter
as better suited to modern industrial production and industrial life.3 63
William Byham, who wrote a book entitled Shogun Management
based on experiences of more than two hundred U.S. and Canadian man-
agers working for Japanese companies, suggests that the shared challenge
facing Japan and the U.S. is to create a third-culture business environ-
ment that integrates the strengths of both management-styles.
6 3
agement practices produce company commitment and job satisfaction in Japan and in the
U.S. The following is an excerpt from the survey results: (1) long-term employment and/age
seniority grading (positive in both countries); (2) cohesive work groups (positive in both
countries); (3) dense supervision; close supervisor-subordinate contact (positive in Japan;
negative in U.S.); (4) "tall," finely-layered hierarchies (negative in both countries; but con-
tributes to management-labor consensus in Japan); (5) formal centralization/de facto decen-
tralization of decision-making (positive in both countries); (6) quality circle participation
(positive in both countries); (7) unions (enterprise-specific in Japan; industry-occupation
specific in the U.S.) (weak negative to null in Japan; strongly negative in U.S.) Lincoln,
supra note 29, at 103.
357. Brown, supra note 152, at 239-40.
358. OucHI, supra note 304.
359. Western philosophers and sociologists, including Plato, Hobbes, and B.F. Skinner,
have asserted that "individual freedom exists only when people willingly subordinate their
self-interests to the social interest." OUCHI, supra note 304, at 65.
360. Partly for the purpose of eliminating a sense of competition among workers, Japa-
nese firms have deliberately avoided drawing a clear line between white and blue-collar posi-
tions. Edwin Reischauer explains the company's paternalistic interest in both groups: "They
usually wear the same work jackets and hats in the plant and eat in the same company
restaurants. Cheap company housing may be provided to both groups, and a great deal of
company indoctrination is included in the initial in-service training for both." REISCHAUER,
supra note 7, at 324.
361. OucHI, supra note 304, at 66.
362. Id.
363. For this purpose, the author presented experiences of more than 200 U.S. and
Canadian managers working for Japanese companies and a small number of Japanese man-
agers. BYHAM, supra note 39, at vii.
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Thus, Japanese multinational firms assume dual responsibilities:
first, to implement human resource strategies, based on the American
model, in order to build a work environment that integrates voices and
experiences of diverse individuals; and second, to help American workers
see themselves as part of a team working together in the pursuit of the
common goal.86' An illustration of an integrated organization by Robert
Wallace of Wallace III & Associates, a management consulting firm, sug-
gests a goal that Japanese multinational firms should aim for:
"[An integrated organization] looks at people as a mosaic in a stained
glass window. The uniqueness of each individual piece is clear, and
this uniqueness creates the beauty of the mosaic when the sun shines
through. Individuals feel included and welcome to an organization if
their uniqueness is valued and honored at the workplace. These work-
ers are also more productive."365
It is time for Japanese companies to learn and appreciate the beauty
of the mosaic. Playing a vital role in the international business commu-
nity, Japanese employers assume the responsibility to develop respect of
the individual in the workplace while maintaining a sense of collective
responsibility."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Japanese multinational firms have long endeavored to triumph in the
world marketplace. Nonetheless, they have yet to gain standing as good
corporate citizens in the global community. Their employment practices
often clash with America's commitment to redress job inequalities
through Title VII. The rise of discrimination suits should alert Japanese
employers to confront and reject the forced homogeneity of their
workforce. They should recognize the ultimate source of victory in litiga-
tion: a workplace that fully integrates6 7 the strengths of diverse individu-
als. 8 Adoption of a merit system would serve as a catalyst for attainment
364. For a discussion on how to make teamwork effective in the corporate setting, see
generally Jon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Discipline of Teams, HARV. Bus.
REv. 111-20 (1993).
365. LAMONT, supra note 336, at 23 (discussing integration, as opposed to assimilation).
366. One scholar explains the inevitable link between individualism and communality
as follows: "It is our sense of our own individual dignity that leads us to appreciate the same
worth of the individuality of other persons." Inoue, supra note 17, at 548.
367. One should distinguish integration, meaning "to bring together as parts, into a
whole" from assimilation, meaning "to make alike." LAMONT, supra note 336, at 23 (relying
on the definition in Webster's Dictionary). American society has traditionally linked the
concept of assimilation with the melting pot metaphor, "where ethnic and racial differences
were standardized into a kind of American puree." This notion contradicts the goal of man-
aging diversity: to enable every member of the group to retain and maximize his or her
individual potential. R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Affirmative Di-
versity, HARV. Bus. RFv. 107, 112 (Mar./Apr. 1990).
368. Creating a multicultural work environment has posed a new challenge for U.S.
domestic corporations as well. The visible increase in the number of women and minorities
in the U.S. labor force has bolstered the need to promote diversity management as a corpo-
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of that goal.
The transition is inevitable even without the legally imposed duty
under Title VII. In Japan as well, the decline of lifetime employment and
the seniority system has necessitated a qualifications-based personnel
policy. Japanese firms must strive to create a work environment reflecting
a broad array of backgrounds and perspectives. Lasting changes must
take place from within. Only with such changes will Japan have em-
barked on the journey to true globalization.
rate policy. An America That Works, a policy statement issued by the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development (an independent research and educational organization for over 225
business executives and educators) contains the following information: blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians will comprise more than half of the net labor force growth between 1988 and
2000; 81.4 percent of women between the ages of 25 and 54 will be participating in the
workforce in 2000. LAMONT, supra note 336, at 7-8. R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., Assistant
Professor at the Harvard Business School and Executive Director of the American Institute
for Managing Diversity, Inc., at Atlanta's Morehourse College, also emphasizes the growing
need for employers to take advantage of a multicultural workforce. Thomas introduces ex-
amples of diversity management by Avon, Corning, Digital, Procter & Gable. Thomas, supra
note 367.
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